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ABSTRACT 
Social vulnerability acknowledges that social structures shape disaster 
vulnerabilities and recovery outcomes. Public housing residents are one of the most 
socially vulnerable people that experience significant losses in disasters. Many factors, 
such as lower income and limited access to information, cause a delay in the housing 
recovery of public housing tenants. To explore these challenges, I examined the disaster 
impacts and recovery of public housing units in Lumberton, North Carolina, following 
the floods induced by Hurricane Matthew in 2016. This research is a part of an 
interdisciplinary recovery-based field study conducted by the Center of Excellence for 
Community Resilience Planning funded by the National Institute of Standards and 
Technology.  
Hurricane Matthew made landfall in North Carolina on October 8, 2016, as a 
Category 1 storm. Several communities, including Lumberton, were devastated by heavy 
rainfall and the river flooding that occurred after Hurricane Matthew. Lumberton is a 
socioeconomically diverse community with 729 public housing units, many of which got 
damaged after the floods. Extensive damages have led to the displacement of many 
public housing families.  
 Using descriptive statistics, mapping, and qualitative analysis, I investigated the 
recovery progress and challenges of public housing residents. Data on race, income, and 
housing tenure of the residents at Block Group level were collected from the 2015 ACS-
5-year estimation to map the social vulnerability and overlaid with the location of the 
public housings and the spatial distribution of residential damages. Also, household 
survey data on disaster impacts, recovery resources, decisions, and dislocations were 
xi 
collected using longitudinal field study surveys conducted in December 2016 shortly 
after the flooding, and January 2018 one year after the disaster. Furthermore, In-depth 
interviews with local officials in Lumberton were utilized to examine recovery challenges 
and progress.  
Findings show that housing tenure, race, and poverty make up the most significant 
portion of public housing residents’ vulnerabilities. These vulnerabilities resulted in 
widespread damages to public housing developments and lengthy displacement of the 
public housing developments. State’s priorities in recovery, absence of strong voice 
advocating for recovery of affordable housing, funding resources, and allocations 
influence the pace of the recovery of public housing residents. 
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CHAPTER 1.    INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Problem Statement 
Disaster losses are increasing around the world. Disaster management attempts to 
reduce the potential losses caused by hazards, help the survivors of the disaster, and offer a 
quick and effective recovery. The disaster management cycle has four stages including 
mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery. Recovery is the least investigated stage of 
these four phases of the disaster cycle (Haas, Kates, & Bowden, 1977; Rubin, Saperstein, & 
Barbee, 1985; Berke, Kartez, & Wenger, 1993; Olshansky, 2005; Zhang & Peacock, 2009). 
Post-disaster recovery is the process of restoring, rebuilding, and reshaping the physical, 
social, economic, and natural environment (Smith & Wenger, 2007). This process includes 
rebuilding homes, businesses, and community assets such as parks, public buildings, and 
community icons, as well as repairing infrastructure (Olshansky, Hopkins, & Johnson, 2012; 
Smith & Wenger, 2007). Housing is a key element of disaster recovery, but housing recovery 
is not an equal process for everyone in a community. Few studies have addressed the 
inequalities in post-disaster housing (Zhang & Peacock, 2009; Green & Olshansky, 2012; 
Green, Bates, & Smyth, 2007; Hamideh, Peacock, & Van Zandt, 2018).  
Scholars have begun to use the concept of social vulnerability to discuss the fact that 
social structures and procedures can cause vulnerabilities. Social vulnerability in regards to 
natural disasters has been defined as “the characteristics of a person or group and their 
situation that influence their capacity to anticipate, cope with, resist and recover from the 
impact of a natural hazard (Blaikie, Cannon, Davis, Wisner, 1994)”. Factors including race or 
ethnicity, income and poverty, gender, age, housing tenure and even religion are considered 
dimensions of social vulnerability (Van Zandt, Peacock, Henry, Grover, Highfield, & Brody, 
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2012; Cutter, Boruff, & Shirley, 2003). These factors affect household capability at all stages 
of a disaster such as preparedness, warning, evacuation, casualties and recovery (Highfield, 
Peacock, & Van Zandt, 2014; Flanegan, Gregory, Hallisey, Heitgerd, & Lewis, 2011; Van 
Zandt et al., 2012; Morrow, 1999).  The social construction of vulnerabilities plays a 
significant role in housing recovery. Specifically, class and racial or ethnic differences have 
been seen to impact the complex social process of housing recovery. 
The literature suggests that socially vulnerable populations may have difficulties in 
achieving or being qualified for housing financial assistance in the aftermath of disasters to 
start the recovery process. They lack the education or language skill necessary for applying 
for financial aid and they have limited savings and insurance (Van Zandt et al., 2012). 
Therefore, disadvantaged communities such as neighborhoods with low-income and minority 
residents recover more slowly than other neighborhoods.  
Public housing complexes are one of the socially vulnerable communities in cities 
where residents cannot afford temporary and permanent housing in the aftermath of disasters. 
Public housing is one of the programs of the Department of Housing and Urban Development 
(HUD) in the U.S. that provides affordable housing for low-income people and households, 
i.e., households with incomes at 30% or less of the Area Median Income (AMI). Historically, 
the public housing program in the U.S. has resulted in segregation as well as the 
concentration of poverty and minorities in distressed neighborhoods, creating socially 
vulnerable spots in cities (Schill, 1993; Carter, Schill, & Wachter, 1998). The literature 
suggests that low-income and minority households experience more damages (Peacock, Van 
Zandt, Zhang, & Highfield, 2014; Morrow, 1999) and go through different recovery 
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trajectories (Hamideh and Rongerude, 2018; Highfield, Peacock, & Van Zandt, 2014; 
Fothergill & Peek, 2014; Van Zand et al., 2012; Morrow, 1999).  
Public housing developments are known for their social vulnerabilities and this 
results in the trajectories of public housing recovery and single-family housing recovery 
being unequal. Unlike single-family housing, public housing recovery has not been 
prioritized in previous studies.  Unequal trajectories of housing recovery, and difficulties of 
various cohorts within a community in affording their housing in the aftermath of disasters, 
call for studies that investigate the housing recovery processes for different types of 
residential units. This knowledge would help drive more actions and policies to address 
inequalities within communities in similar possible disasters. I have therefore examined the 
recovery process of public housing residents within a community that was affected by a 
natural disaster. Using a case study approach, I investigated the challenges of the housing 
recovery of public housing residents in the aftermath of a natural disaster resulting from their 
specific vulnerabilities. 
More specifically, this study investigates the flood impacts and the challenges of the 
recovery of public housing units in Lumberton, North Carolina, after the floods caused by 
Hurricane Matthew in 2016. This knowledge would help communities to plan, prepare for, 
and recover from disasters. This study is part of a larger, longitudinal and interdisciplinary 
recovery-based field study in Lumberton, North Carolina, conducted by the Center of 
Excellence (CoE) for Risk-Based Community Resilience Planning with collaborators from 
the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). 
1.2 Background 
Hurricane Matthew made landfall in a few countries including the Dominican 
Republic, Haiti, Cuba, Bahamas, and the United States between September 28 to October 9, 
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2016 (Stewart, 2017). It was classified as Category 3 hurricane when it hit the east coast of 
the United States on October 7 (Van de Lindt et al., 2018). The storm hit Florida, Georgia, 
some parts of South Carolina, and North Carolina. Hurricane Matthew made landfall in 
North Carolina on October 8, 2016, as a Category 1 storm (Van de Lindt et al., 2018). Some 
areas in North Carolina received more than 15 inches of rainfall in two days. Several 
communities were devastated by the heavy rainfall and river flooding that began after 
Hurricane Matthew. Approximately 100,000 homes, businesses, and government buildings 
were damaged in North Carolina due to Hurricane Matthew with an estimated $1.5 billion 
worth of damages (Van de Lindt et al., 2018).  
Lumberton, the county seat of Robeson County, is located in the southeast part of 
North Carolina. The town was named Lumberton because Lumber River bisects the city. The 
Indian name of Lumbee was initially used for the river that came from an Indian word that 
means “black water” (Van de Lindt et al., 2018). It is believed that Native Americans may 
have lived in the region since 20,000 B.C. and the river and its swamps were the homes of 
several displaced Native Americans of the coastal region as Europeans advanced westward 
(City of Lumberton, n.d.). Today, Lumberton has a population of 21,707. The town was one 
of the communities in North Carolina devastated due to the floods induced by Hurricane 
Matthew. The Lumber River crested at 21.5 feet above the datum and flooded on October 8. 
Flooding was exacerbated by ground already saturated from the heavy September rains. 
The floods destroyed over half of the total residential units in Lumberton including 
damages to 267 out of 729 public housing units and displacing 267 families living in these 
units (HACL, 2017). The Housing Authority of Lumberton (HACL) estimated the flood 
damages to the public housing developments to be a total of $8 million, with approximately 
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$5 million in remaining unmet needs. Unmet needs were defined as necessary expenses and 
serious needs that are unmet through insurance or other means (State of North Carolina, 
2017). The households living in damaged public housing units lost their apartments and were 
displaced for more than seven months after the flood. More than half of these families did not 
return to Lumberton.  
Lumberton was chosen as a case study because of its specific characteristics.  
Lumberton is a diverse city from a socio-demographic stand point with a third of households 
who live at or below the poverty level. Lumberton has a large proportion of minorities with a 
high percentage of African American and Native American. Around 52.3% of the housing 
units in Lumberton are occupied by renters1. There are 24 low-income housing apartment 
complexes which contain 2,228 affordable apartments for rent in Lumberton. About 1,528 of 
these rental apartments are income-based housing. Among them, there are 210 Project-Based 
Section 8 subsidized apartments (PBV) in the town.2 PBV is a governmental funded program 
that provide rental units with the cost of 30% of the low-income household’s gross income in 
a privately owned or managed rental unit. This voucher stays with the building and cannot be 
applied to the renters after moving out of that rental unit3. Before Hurricane Matthew, 
Lumberton also had 729 public housing units in twelve developments and less than 596 
section 8 vouchers4 (HACL, 2017). Section 8 vouchers are another governmental program 
which assists very low-income, elderly, and disabled families to afford renting a unit in the 
private market. The local officials informed that the HACL is the largest housing authority in 
                                                 
1 https://affordablehousingonline.com/housing-search/North-Carolina/Lumberton 
2 https://affordablehousingonline.com/housing-search/North-Carolina/Lumberton 
3 www.housinglink.org/SubsidizedHousing/ProjectBased  
4 https://www.hud.gov/topics/housing_choice_voucher_program_section_8 
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Robeson County. However, the city had a shortage of affordable housing which is shown by 
the fact that 53.3% of renters spent 30% or more of their income on their rent (HACL, 2017).  
1.3 Purpose of the Study 
This research seeks to improve the current state of knowledge about the recovery 
challenges of public housing units through examining the recovery of public housing units in 
Lumberton following the floods caused by Hurricane Matthew in 2016. Previous researchers 
have focused on the role of social vulnerability factors in the housing recovery and some 
researchers have examined the different recovery trajectories of different housing types. 
However, few studies have worked on recovery with regards to the interconnected impacts of 
social vulnerability factors and housing types, such as public housing residents. Few pieces 
of research have focused on recovery of public housing unit in general, and how this 
recovery is shaped by social vulnerabilities and access to resources. This thesis aims to 
address these gaps in the research/literature, specifically in regards to three points of interest. 
The main question is: What are the obstacles for recovery of public housing units? The sub-
questions are as follows: Question 1: What are the specific vulnerabilities of public housing 
residents in the face of disasters as socially vulnerable people? Question 2: How do the 
vulnerabilities of public housing residents shape the recovery outcome of the individual 
households in the aftermath of disasters? Question 3: How do funding sources, plans, and 
policies affect the recovery outcomes of public housing units? 
I used a mixed method approach for my analyses. I used descriptive statistics and 
mapping methods, as well as qualitative analysis to find the answers to my research 
questions. The investigation is undertaken in three steps. First, I mapped social vulnerability 
in Lumberton Block Groups and the specific vulnerabilities of public housing residents using 
the social vulnerability index weighted map. I then investigated the impact of social 
7 
vulnerability factors on the outcome of the public housing recovery, and I found the gaps in 
funding, decision making, and policies for the restoration of the units of public housing.  
1.4. Structure of Thesis 
This thesis is organized as follows. First, I review the literature on community and 
housing recovery and research on the recovery policies and funding, and factors that 
determine disparities in housing recovery including social vulnerability. Then I provide a 
brief history of public housing in relation to disaster impacts and the challenges of the 
recovery of these units. This review concludes with a discussion of the gaps in the literature 
about the recovery challenges of the public housing units. Next, the data collected for this 
study and the methodology of data analysis is presented. In this chapter, I discuss the data 
collection process, including interviews, field notes, and surveys as well as the data analysis 
steps for each of the research questions. Then, in the following chapter, I explain the case 
study and the results of the analyses. Finally, in the last chapter, I summarize the study 
findings and discuss the research implications and limitations. 
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CHAPTER 2.    LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Introduction  
Disaster losses in the United States continue to increase. Weather-related hazards 
including hurricanes represent 86% of the total losses in the past 45 years in the United States 
(Cutter, Johnson, Finch, & Berry, 2007). More than 69% of all the hazard damages followed 
by flooding and severe weather are caused by hurricanes and tropical storms. “Disaster” has 
various meanings in different contexts and disciplines. In this thesis, disaster refers to the 
United Nation International Strategy for Disaster Risk Reduction’s (UNISDR) definition. 
UNISDR (2017) defines disaster as “a serious disruption of the routine of a community or a 
society causing widespread human, material, economic, or environmental losses which 
exceed the capability of the affected community or society in managing their resources.” 
Disasters as unusual events, overwhelms the response capacity of a community and causes 
various damages and losses in all aspects.  
Disaster management attempts to reduce or eliminate the potential losses caused by 
hazards, provide prompt and proper assistance to the survivors of the disaster, and offer a 
fast-effective recovery (Pathirage, Seneviratne, Amaratunga, & Haigh, 2012). Disaster 
management encompasses four phases in its cycle, including mitigation, preparedness, 
response, and recovery. Mitigation aims to decrease the impact of hazards utilizing structural 
and non-structural measures. Preparedness refers to the activities taken before disasters to 
guarantee an effective response to hazards. Response deals with the provision of assistance 
and life preservation for the affected people and takes place immediately after a disaster and 
has a short-term duration. Recovery refers to all decisions and activities that are implemented 
in the aftermath of a disaster to restore and improve the living condition of the affected 
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community with a goal of mitigating future possible disaster risks (Tun, Gehbauer, Senitz, & 
Mueller, 2007). In this thesis, I will focus on the recovery phase of the disaster cycle.  
 In the recovery, a community attempts to return to a normal or improved level of 
operation by allocating resources, rebuilding, and providing lifeline repairs (Fothergill & 
Peek, 2004; Bolin 1995; Olshansky, Hopkins, & Johnson, 2012). The Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA, 2000) defines recovery as “the non-emergency measures 
following disasters that aim to bring back all formal and informal systems to a normal state.” 
All the activities including reconstruction, restoration, rehabilitation, and post-disaster 
redevelopment are a part of the recovery process. This stage involves seeking 
accommodation, rebuilding homes, public agencies and utilities repairing infrastructure, and 
households surviving lean times as well as coping with new strains (Olshansky et al., 2012; 
Smith & Wenger 2007). Recovery is an opportunity for the development of disaster affected 
regions, as will be seen. It is a multidimensional, complex process that involves many 
stakeholders. Therefore, it is important to understand that this process is unequal.  
The post-disaster context provides unique urban development opportunities. Local 
jurisdiction have access to external recovery aids to facilitate economic, social, and physical 
developments by strengthening local organizational capacity. This provides the local 
authorities with the chance of defining goals, controlling resources, and directing 
redevelopment initiatives with long term economic and social benefits. Urban planners often 
view a disaster as an opportunity for making physical, economic, and social improvements 
(Berke, Kartez, & Wenger, 1993; Olshansky, 2005). The improvements in physical 
development patterns can reduce vulnerabilities and mitigate future hazard risks.  Rebuilding 
a community with lower vulnerability to disasters in comparison to pre-disaster conditions 
10 
can occur with appropriate construction, restoration, and land use standards (Topping & 
Schwab, 2014).  
Post-disaster recovery is a long-term and interdependent process that involves 
multiple organizations with different capabilities and requires interactions between these 
organizations in response to a range of technical, social, and economic issues that produce 
effects of varying intensity on different groups in the population (Olshansky et al., 2012; 
Comfort, Birkland, Cigler, & Nance, 2010; Rubin et al., 1985). Some scholars believe that 
community recovery may or may not correlate with physical reconstruction (Olshansky & 
Johnson, 2014). Bolin (1995) finds that community recovery is a multidimensional process 
that involves economic, psychosocial and physical restoration. In the aftermath of the 
disaster, the community needs to keep the businesses and rebuild the houses to shelter the 
families. Socioeconomic factors play a significant role in the pace of recovery, which means 
people who are better integrated into economic and social networks recover faster 
(Olshansky, 2005; Bolin, 1995). However, people with few resources get less attention from 
the organizations providing aid resources and recover slower.  
Recovery does not have a specific endpoint or agreed upon measure of success. It 
concerns the rehabilitation of people’s lives more than the reconstruction of buildings and 
infrastructures (Olshansky, 2005). It is a process of interaction and decision making among 
various groups and institutions including families, businesses, organizations, and society. 
Some scholars subsume that recovery eventually blends with normal processes of 
community, while some others argue that recovery never returns a community to pre-existing 
conditions (Olshansky, 2005; Olshansky & Johnson, 2014). Rather, it requires accepting a 
new normal rather than a return to pre-disaster conditions (Johnson, 2014). Recovery always 
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encompasses changes. While cities aim to rebuild themselves as much as they can to return to 
where they were before the disaster, they cannot avoid the transformations of urban 
environment following disasters. However, significant changes are difficult to achieve since 
there are political and administrative limitations, but in general, cities see a level of physical 
improvement in the aftermath of disasters.  
Although many actors are involved in the recovery process, the federal government 
has a significant role. One of the crucial functions of federal government in recovery is to 
facilitate, support, inform and influence the many other recovery actors. However, the 
bureaucratic system is limited by the time compression of the recovery process, which has 
resulted in an increasingly critical role of nongovernmental organizations (NGO) in recovery. 
Nonetheless, the higher level of governments can provide technical and financial resources to 
meet the needs of the recovery actors that NGOs struggle to match (Olshansky & Johnson, 
2014). Therefore, local leadership, local economy, resources, and recovery policies are 
involved in the recovery process.  
2.2 Recovery Policies 
There are various management approaches for the management and decision-making 
processes in post-disaster contexts. Recovery management has three categories including 
centralized, partly decentralized, and decentralized. In the centralized approach, the national 
government controls recovery management and policy creation. In the partly decentralized 
method, organizations at different levels of government manage policy making with close 
coordination with the national government. The decentralized approach includes policy-
making and management of various organizations at multiple levels of government in which 
the national government provide some support and coordination (Sylves, 2015).  
12 
In the United States, recovery management and policy-making take a decentralized 
approach. The structure of disaster response and recovery policies in the U.S. respects the 
dominance of states to direct activities. This policy leads to the federal government acting as 
a supporter of state and local governments due to the reasoning that states know the unique 
requirements of their geography and citizens. Therefore, while the policies are top-down and 
applied to the whole nation, federal agencies do not dictate the actions of state and local 
officials in emergencies (Johnson & Olshansky, 2017).  
The disaster management decision-making system within the U.S. has local 
governments, special districts, and Native American tribal governments responsible for the 
emergency phase and recovery process in the aftermath of disasters, with regional, state, and 
national agencies supporting them as requested. This system is bottom-up but there is 
cooperation between all levels of government as well as many private organizations. This 
cooperation means that states assist local governments, and the federal government aids both 
as needed.  
The Disaster Relief Act of 1974 was the primary law that first defined the system and 
the role of the federal government in disaster response and recovery. This Act was amended 
in 1988 and titled the Stafford Act. This amendment defined the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA) as the lead agency in organizing the role of federal 
government in the preparation, prevention, mitigation, response, and recovery stages of 
natural or manmade disasters (Comerio 1998; Topping & Schwab, 2014; Johnson & 
Olshansky, 2017). FEMA oversees four disaster laws: The National Flood Insurance Act, 
Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, the Disaster Mitigation 
Act, and the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act. These laws address disaster 
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management and their contents are organized under four categories: mitigation, preparedness, 
response, and recovery. FEMA also coordinates recovery-related programs under the 
Stafford Act including Individual Assistance, Public Assistance, and the Hazard Mitigation 
Grant Program (HMGP). In addition to FEMA, there are some other federal agencies with 
important roles and resources in recovery, such as the U.S. Department of Housing and 
Urban Development (HUD), the Small Business Administration (SBA), the Economic 
Development Administration, and the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) (Olshansky 
& Johnson, 2014; Johnson & Olshansky, 2017), and army corps of engineers. 
The Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act is the nation’s primary 
disaster law which directly addresses disaster management. This law is primarily 
implemented by FEMA and the U.S. Department of Homeland and Security (DHS). Under 
the Stafford Act, the governor of a disaster-stricken state can generate federal involvement in 
the disaster management process by requesting the president to declare an emergency or 
major disaster (Topping & Schwab, 2014). According to FEMA (2016), this request can be 
applied when the governor finds the severity and magnitude of the disaster beyond the 
capabilities of the state, and so federal assistance is required to complement the states’ 
resources, execution of the states’ emergency plan. The state and federal government follow 
cost-sharing requirements during this process. After this request, the president has to 
determine that the state’s capabilities are not sufficient for addressing the disaster and that the 
state needs federal assistance for disaster response and recovery.  
2.3 Housing Recovery 
Housing is an important segment of physical, financial, and social infrastructure in 
the U.S. The structures used for the housing represent the highest portion of all buildings in 
the U.S. in local scale, county, and the state levels (Comerio, 1997; Sutley & Hamideh, 
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2017). Housing recovery is a significant component of post-disaster recovery (Bolin & 
Stanford, 1997). Housing units face the most significant damages in natural disasters 
(Comerio, 2014). Moreover, a house is an essential component of the economy and the 
primary source of investment for the majority of Americans. Re-establishing housing plays a 
crucial role in the ability of individuals to return to their normal activities, domestic 
functions, and routines (Peacock et al., 2017). Housing recovery is a major part of a 
community recovery. Community recovery depends on housing recovery.  
In the U.S., housing recovery is driven by the market and the government does not 
have an active role in this stage of recovery. Housing recovery is managed by the market 
which differs from the public facilities and infrastructure because housing is privately owned 
(Comerio, 1998; Zhang & Peacock, 2009; Comerio, 2014). This means that while the federal 
and state governments guide the financing elements in the recovery process, the basic tenet 
of government remains to follow a hands-off intervention strategy (Comerio 1998; Peacock, 
Dash, Zhang, & Van Zandt, 2017).  
Before the 1970s, the U.S. disaster assistance policies did not include any funding for 
housing recovery. After the 1970s, some disaster assistance programs were created to help 
homeowners recover (Comerio, 1998; Comerio, 2014). After the declaration of a disaster, 
federal agencies play roles in housing recovery through FEMA, SBA, and HUD (Bolin 1995; 
Zhang & Peacock, 2009, Comerio, 2014). The Minimal Home Repair Program (MHR) of 
FEMA provides owners with partial insurance with grants to cover the minor repairs and 
rebuilding costs to build safe and habitable shelters. SBA provides Disaster Loan Program to 
assist the rebuilding costs of the insured and uninsured properties. The amount of the loan, 
interest rate, and terms are decided based on the value of the property as well as the 
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borrower’s credit. Recently, HUD plays a more significant role than the FEMA grant or the 
SBA loan in housing recovery through its CDBG and HOME investment partnership 
programs. Local officials in federally declared disaster regions can apply for the grants 
provided by HUD, or if they already have a pending request, they can expedite said request 
(Zhang & Peacock, 2009; Peacock et al., 2017). Although the CDBG funds are a great 
assistance to disaster-stricken communities, the political requirements can act as deterrents 
since HUD requires action plans supported by community involvement in order receive any 
funds (Olshansky & Johnson, 2014). 
The U.S. market-based approach has resulted in a neglect of housing recovery in local 
communities’ recovery policies (Bolin, 1985; Zhang, 2006). In the market-based recovery, 
the owners of the houses are responsible for restoring and reconstructing the units either 
themselves or by contracting others to do the rebuilding. National recovery policies assume 
that insurance, private funds, or both will be applied for the housing recovery (Comerio, 
1998; Zhang & Peacock, 2009; Comerio, 2014). Similarly, renters and their families have to 
recover on their own and this often results in them having move to other homes.  
The market-based approach is a conservative method that aims to restore the pre-
disaster conditions of a community (Bolin, 1985). Housing markets in the U.S. are known by 
their sequential filtering in which the lower-income households live in physically 
deteriorated and unsafe neighborhoods, while higher-income households live in high-quality 
homes in safer areas (Foley, 1980). This means that on the one hand, focusing on the 
distribution of housing in the U.S., it becomes apparent that inequality exists in the pre-
disaster housing stock that results in higher levels of damages and higher demands of 
financial resources for repairing and rebuilding these units after the disaster. On the other 
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hand, the market-based recovery may accentuate the pre-disaster inequalities (Bolin, 1985; 
Bolin & Stanford, 1991; Kamel & Loukaitou-Sideris, 2003; Zhang, 2006). Studies show that 
marginalized communities are confronted with higher hurdles to access resources, to express 
collective needs, and to engage in decision-making (Kamel & Loukaitou-Sideris, 2003).  
Therefore, these social groups have a longer displacement period and a slower recovery pace 
in comparison to the other groups in a community.  
2.4 Recovery Funding Resources 
Local governments deal with various emergencies on a regular basis. If they need 
additional assistance and resources, they have to request from the neighboring communities 
for emergency aid based on their pre-existing mutual aid agreements. If resources from the 
neighboring communities prove inadequate, the localities can appeal the state emergency 
management agency with a request for a declaration by the governor to demand aid from 
other state agencies. If the emergency resources from the state are insufficient, the state then 
demands for a federal disaster declaration by the president (Topping & Schwab, 2014). After 
the emergency declaration from the president, the U.S. Congress has various funding options 
that complement the Stafford Act allocations in assisting states and local governments to 
finance recovery efforts.  
Federal agencies provide a community with various funding options in the aftermath 
of disasters. This study focuses on public housing recovery. Therefore, in this section, 
various funding resources which can be allocated for the housing recovery within a 
community are discussed. These resources are provided by federal agencies including 
FEMA, HUD, SBA, and insurance in the aftermath of disasters.  
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2.4.1 Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) 
FEMA has four federal programs in terms of assisting recovery efforts including the 
Public Assistance Program (PA), the Hazard Mitigation Grant Program (HMGP), the 
Community Disaster Loan Program (CDL), and the Individual and Household Assistance 
Program (IHP). During the managing of applications and the distribution of resources 
process, state emergency management agencies have a significant intermediary role in 
collaboration and on behalf of FEMA.  
Public Assistance (PA) is the primary federal assistance for the local government. 
This fund provides the state, local government agencies, private nonprofit organizations, and 
federally recognized tribal organizations support for activities including debris removal, 
emergency protective measures, and repair, replacement, or restoration of damaged facilities 
and infrastructures (FEMA, 2005). Funds of these activities are granted and are proved to be 
eligible for reimbursement only after a large documentation of the damage, proposed scope 
of works, and cost estimations has been completed. The federal share of assistance is at least 
75% of the eligible cost, and the state and local governments can have up to 25% of the cost 
(FEMA, 2005; Johnson, 2014).  
Hazard Mitigation Grant Program (HMGP) funding is provided under section 404 of 
the Stafford Act, and contributes to the hazard mitigation plans of state and tribal 
organizations. This funding is allocated based on a cost-share basis similar to PA program. 
However, it is not available until much later in the recovery process (FEMA, 2005; Johnson, 
2014).  
The Community Disaster Loan (CDL) is provided by FEMA to assist local 
governments in offering essential services when the local government or any eligible 
jurisdiction has suffered an extensive tax or any other revenue loss. The congress passed this 
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program in 2005 for the first time, authorizing FEMA to provide CDL loans. The jurisdiction 
in question has to reveal a need for financial support to perform its governmental functions. 
This loan is not to exceed 25% of the local government’s annual budget and has a maximum 
of $5 million (FEMA, 2005).  
The Individual and Households Program (IHP) provides eligible renters and displaced 
homeowners with grants to find shelter within the boundaries of the state quickly after the 
disaster. This assistance can also be used for other needs that are not met through other 
assistance forms and insurance such as personal property, transportation, etc., and for any 
hardship or injury caused by the disaster. This funding is on a cost-share basis in which there 
is 100% federal assistance for housing, and 75% federal and 25% state or local governments 
for the other needs (FEMA, 2005). It is short-term assistance and usually is not substantial 
enough to cover the financial recovery needs of a household (Johnson, 2014). FEMA noticed 
in 2017 that the maximum allowable IHP fund is $34,000 for any major disaster declared on 
or after October 1, 2016 (FEMA, 2017). 
2.3.2 U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development 
Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) in general is a flexible program that 
was established in 1974 by HUD. This program aims to provide resources to communities to 
address community development needs. The CDBG program provides local government and 
states annual grants to ensure decent affordable housing for the most vulnerable population in 
the communities and to create jobs by expanding and retaining businesses.  HUD determines 
the amount of grant based on several factors of the community need, including extent of 
poverty, population, housing overcrowding, and population growth lag related to other 
metropolitan areas. At least 70% of this grant must be used over a 1-, 2-, or 3-year period for 
activities that benefit low and moderate-income persons. Each of the activities must meet one 
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of the government’s objectives including “(1) benefit low- and moderate-income persons, (2) 
prevention or elimination of slums or blight, or (3) address community development needs 
having a particular urgency because existing conditions pose a serious and immediate threat 
to the health or welfare of the community for which other funding is not available.”5 
In the disaster context and after an emergency or a major disaster declaration, HUD 
offers the Federal Housing Assistance Program which provides housing vouchers to the 
victims of the disaster and funds the rebuilding of public housing units as well as mortgage 
assistance. HUD can also expedite annual awards such as CDBG programs and the Federal 
HOME Investment Partnership Program (HOME) for the disaster-affected area. These funds 
are applied to HUD by Congress and are not a part of Stafford Act. This authorization means 
that HUD can waive many regulatory requirements (Johnson, 2014).  
One of the additional disaster recovery funds of Congress is the HUD Community 
Development Block Grant-Disaster Recovery (CDBG-DR) program. Congress can use the 
CDBG-DR fund rapidly if it meets particularly urgent community development needs that 
pose a serious and immediate threat to the public. Moreover, regarding the flexibility of 
CDBG-DR funds, they can be used in various ways such as restoration of essential services, 
mitigation of future possible disasters, and long-term recovery of businesses, houses, and 
infrastructures (Johnson and Olshansky, 2017).  
Local governments and states as the grant recipients must develop and submit an 
action plan for the disaster recovery before receiving funds. The action plan should define the 
needs, strategies, and the uses of the disaster recovery founds for the projects. In addition, the 
grant recipients have to report the recovery progress quarterly. 
                                                 
5 https://www.hud.gov/program_offices/comm_planning/communitydevelopment/programs 
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The CDBG-DR is the major source of federal recovery assistance. The largest amount 
of CDBG-DR assistance in the history of this program was $19.7 billion for the post-Katrina 
recovery and reconstruction. However, the CDBG recovery program was implemented in a 
class and racial discriminatory manner that was against the fair housing purposes for low and 
moderate-income households. Therefore, CDBG funding approved in 2005 limited the 
amount of grants that a state can use for administrative expenses to 5%; required each state to 
develop recovery plans that have to be approved by HUD; seek waivers for the normal 
requirements except for the ones related to fair housing, nondiscrimination, labor standards, 
and environmental review; and prevent the use of funds for activities that can be otherwise 
provided and reimbursed by FEMA or by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Gotham, 2014; 
Johnson, 2014).  
2.4.3 U.S. Small Business Administration 
SBA provides an assistance program in the form of loans for all sizes of businesses, 
homeowners, and renters for the restoration of their damages. The loan covers the losses that 
are not compensated by insurance. They are activated immediately after the disaster 
declaration. Individuals and homeowners can apply for it through FEMA while business 
owners can apply directly to the SBA (Johnson, 2014).   
Homeowners can apply for the loan to repair or to replace their properties up to 
$200,000. The loans are used for upgrading homes only if it is required based on the building 
codes. If a homeowner makes improvements to reduce the future risk of disasters, he may be 
eligible for up to 20% of property’s value increase in loan amount. Renters and homeowners 
may also apply for up to $40,000 to replace or repair personal property (SBA, n.d.b).  
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2.4.4 Insurance 
Insurance is the primary financial source for the recovery in the U.S. It occurs both in 
the form of government and private sources. The National Flood Insurance (NFIP) is another 
large federally funded disaster recovery program. However, it is funded by the flood-prone 
properties’ owners and businesses rather than by congress. NFIP provides the property 
owners with insurance settlements for their flood losses as well as providing funds for 
buyouts of flood-prone properties (Rubin, Saperstein, & Barbee,1985; FEMA, 2014; Johnson 
& Olshansky, 2017). 
The communities that are in the flood prone areas and do not become involved in the 
NFIP within one year of notification that they are in flood zones are not eligible for getting 
any federal assistance for the recovery and reconstruction purposes. Additionally, anyone 
who received any flood disaster assistance for any repair, restoration, or replacement of any 
property and failed to have flood insurance will not be eligible for any federal disaster 
assistance for any damages due to recurring floods (Johnson, 2014). 
Private insurance is one of the most critical sources of recovery that goes directly to 
policyholders in the disaster-affected regions. Policies cover structures, contents, and the 
costs of additional residential or business interruptions. Some states and local governments 
may choose to be self-insured instead of having disaster-related private insurance. Therefore, 
they have to rely on the federal programs such as FEMA’s PA to restore public properties. 
However, the public property which is located in FEMA designated special flood hazard area 
will receive PA for the restoration in the aftermath of a flood only if it is insured (Johnson, 
2014).  
According to the process, as mentioned earlier regarding funding and different 
financial sources in the aftermath of a disaster, it can be concluded that money is a driving 
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force in the recovery process. A large amount of money can speed up rebuilding. However, 
in previous disasters, it seems that there was never enough money and rarely was the money 
available within the time that was needed (Olshansky, 2005). It appears that setting priorities 
for communities given the limited funds has been a big challenge in most disasters due to the 
fact that the process does not follow a rational system. Financial resources in the forms of 
loans are required immediately but they are not ready immediately, creating problems for 
many years after the disaster. Additionally, the delivery of resources is a crucial factor for 
recovery and is affected by the national political context. It has been observed that if local 
representatives within communities have good connections with the federal party power, they 
can influence both the quantity and speed of financial assistance, thereby improving disaster 
recovery results (Olshansky, 2005).  
2.5 Disparities in Housing Recovery 
Housing recovery plays a crucial role in the community recovery. Housing recovery can be 
unequal, where some neighborhoods recover fast whereas others lag behind. This section 
focuses on the various factors that cause residential recovery disparities including housing 
tenure and social vulnerability. While housing tenure is a factor of social vulnerability, it is 
considered as a separate section in this chapter because of the focus of this thesis on public 
housing.  
2.5.1 Housing Tenure 
Housing tenure defines the relationship between the household and the housing unit. 
Housing tenure has a real impact on the ability of the household to anticipate, prepare for, 
respond to, and recover from a disaster (Lee & Van Zandt, 2018; Hamideh & Rongerude, 
2018). Renters have less control on limited sources to maintain, improve, and repair their 
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homes in comparison to the owners (Lee & Van Zandt, 2018; Van Zandt et al., 2012). 
Housing tenure factor results in diverse disparities in different parts of the recovery process.  
In the U.S., the focus of federal policy has been on the emergency phase. Restoration 
and reconstruction of the houses have to be done by the property owners, regardless of if they 
have to do it by themselves or contract others to do the work for them. Therefore, the 
financial burden of recovery is on the private sources including insurance, loans and personal 
savings. Consequently, recovery requirements of low-income homeowners and renters in 
most cases cannot be fulfilled sufficiently.  
Rental units have specific recovery issues and problems. The policies assume that 
renters can find another alternative rental, while multifamily housing losses may leave many 
renters homeless in the aftermath of disasters. The owners of such rental units often decide 
not to invest on housing replacement because there is less profit in the low-income market 
(Fussell & Harris, 2014; Comerio, 2014). The fact that tenants have no control over their 
homes may cause limitations when considering hazard mitigation options. Homeowners are 
often more prepared for the disasters than the renters because they stay longer in the unit and 
they have more incentives to invest in their units. Landlords of multiunit houses invest less 
for mitigation measures due to the complicated costs that may increase the rents in the long-
term. Like mitigation, in the aftermath of a disaster, the pace of the recovery of rental units 
are different from the privately-owned units (Peacock et al., 2007; Lee & Van Zandt, 2018). 
Compared with owned properties, rental units recover slow.    
Rental disaster financial assistance sources are typically slow because of the political 
and rental market forces (Fussell & Harris, 2014; Fothergill & Peek, 2004). For example, in 
the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, FEMA assistance for small rental apartments was issued 
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two years after the hurricane through the Road Home Program. Therefore, in New Orleans, 
the economic and social pressures resulted in the increase of rents (Fussell & Harris, 2014). 
While the landlords of low-income units are reluctant to restore the units due to limited 
profits, other owners of rental units may take the opportunity of the disaster and rebuild their 
properties for a higher rent market. Either way, the landlords are responsible for the recovery 
of the building and providing safe occupancy. The lack of prompt financial assistance caused 
a longer reconstruction because of the delays of landlords in rebuilding due to the limited 
financial assets, especially when they owned multiple rental units (Zhang, 2006; Fussell & 
Harris, 2014). 
2.5.2 Social Vulnerability 
Housing recovery is a complex socially constructed process. Household 
characteristics of affected communities such as damages level, financial resources, housing 
requirements and preferences, knowledge and availability of shelter options, household 
demographics, and social factors affect housing recovery (Bolin & Stanford, 1991). Natural 
disasters magnify the existing pre-disaster inequalities (Bolin, 1985; Bolin and Stanford, 
1991; Kamel and Loukaitou-Sideris, 2003; Zhang, 2006). Pre-disaster social patterns in the 
housing market have impacts on post-disaster housing recovery. Therefore, disasters are not 
“equal opportunity” occasions, they affect various cohorts of people in different ways. 
Multiple disciplines, including disaster management, use the concept of “vulnerability.” In 
disaster management literature, the vulnerability concept incorporates the conditions and 
characteristics that make people vulnerable. 
Vulnerability discusses the weakness or possibility of losses due to destructive 
impacts of a disaster caused by hazards (Van Zandt et al., 2012). Vulnerabilities can be in 
different shapes such as exposure to the natural or built environment risks. However, a 
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concept that has begun to be discussed is that social structures and procedures are likewise 
causing vulnerability. For instance, Morrow (1999) declares that disaster vulnerability rises 
out of daily social and economic conditions. This approach highlights the prominent role of 
social systems in community vulnerability towards hazards (Bergstrand, Mayer, Brumback, 
& Zhang, 2015). Cutter (1996, 530) defines social vulnerability as “the susceptibility of 
social groups or society at large to potential losses (structural and nonstructural) from hazard 
events and disasters.” Blaikie et al. (1994, 11) describe social vulnerability as “the 
characteristics of a person or group and their situation that influence their capacity to 
anticipate, cope with, resist and recover from the impact of a natural hazard.” Social 
vulnerability focuses on features and diversity of people according to their social and cultural 
background. 
 Socioeconomic factors play a crucial role in all aspects of social phenomena such as 
disasters (Fothergill & Peek, 2014). Therefore, factors like race or ethnicity, income and 
poverty, gender as well as factors like age, housing tenure and even religion are included as 
dimensions of social vulnerability (Van Zandt et al., 2012; Cutter, Boruff, & Shirley, 2003; 
Tate, 2012). Social vulnerability factors often result in intensified vulnerability, since socially 
vulnerable people tend to cluster in poor-quality neighborhoods (Morrow, 1999). This 
clustering causes low-income and minority households to experience more damages 
(Peacock et al., 2014; Morrow, 1999). Furthermore, it should be noted that social 
vulnerability factors affect the household in all stages of a disaster including preparedness, 
warning, evacuation, casualties, and recovery. This means that social vulnerability not only 
increases the risk of damages but also contributes to different post-disaster outcomes 
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(Highfield, Peacock, & Van Zandt, 2014; Fothergill & Peek, 2014; Flanegan et al., 2011; 
Van Zandt et al., 2012; Morrow, 1999).  
Low-income and minority households may have difficulties in achieving housing 
financial assistance to start the recovery process since they have difficulties in applying for 
aid as well as possessing limited savings and insurance. On the other hand, the members of 
racial and ethnic minorities in most cases are less likely to qualify and receive aids such as 
loans and grants (Fothergill, Maestas, & Darlington, 1999). Many of these communities may 
not be covered by powerful insurance companies or their insurance payments may be 
reported as insufficient by the companies. Low-income households may also have limited 
access to transportation due to the extensive disruption of public transportation in the 
aftermath of disasters. This lack of mobility may slow their recovery efforts (Zhang, 2006).  
Racial or ethnic groups often are underrepresented during the recovery planning 
process due to their lack of representation in decision-making groups and lack of economic 
power (Van Zandt et al., 2012; Hamideh & Rongerude, 2018). With less economic power 
and political representation, these marginalized cohorts are often excluded from the decision 
making and planning process. Due to receiving limited aid, according to Zhang and Peacock 
(2010), neighborhoods with low-income and minority residents recover more slowly in 
comparison to other neighborhoods. Consequently, these different trajectories in housing 
recovery draw attention towards planning in order to reduce unequal reconstruction 
processes.  
One of the community cohorts that faces various challenges in the aftermath of 
disasters due to their vulnerabilities are the residents of public housing units. They are often 
low-income, minorities, elderly and in some cases persons with disabilities who live in 
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multifamily, governmental, or voucher based rental units. They are neither homeowners nor 
renters. These characteristics make the housing recovery of these residents complicated in 
comparison to the other cohorts of a community.  
2.6 Public Housing and Disaster 
In the disaster context, HUD works with the local partners to shelter the displaced 
public housing residents. HUD provides regulatory relief through waivers or suspensions of 
standard requirements to accelerate the recovery process. When disaster strikes, FEMA and 
HUD work together on a joint housing assistance program (HUD, n.d.). These assistance 
programs are mostly for the temporary sheltering of public housing displaced residents and 
are different in various disasters. For example, in the aftermath of Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, 
and Ike, HUD provided a Disaster Housing Assistance Program (DHAP) through local 
housing authorities for temporary long-term housing of the public housing households. 
DHAP provides displaced households with temporary rental assistance, a reasonable amount 
that covers the cost difference between what the household can afford, and their rent. After 
several months, these households are needed to pay a greater amount of their rent to be 
encouraged and to be prepared for the full responsibility of their housing costs at the end of 
the program (NLIHC, 2017). The Disaster Voucher Program (DVP) also provided for the 
public housing residents to be sheltered and Tenant Protection Voucher (TPV) were 
distributed to the former residents of public housing developments which were planned to be 
demolished or redeveloped in the aftermath of Katrina (Henrici, Helmuth, & Fernandes, 
2010).  
There is no predefined policy for the permanent recovery of public housing units, and 
their recovery is often a function of political agendas. Local housing authorities not only 
have little economic motivation in restoring damaged units but are also sometimes 
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confronted with political resistance against the replacing of lost units (Hamideh & 
Rongerude, 2018). Thus, local housing authorities use the opportunity provided by the 
disaster to demolish public housing units using emergency financial resources. They may 
demolish the developments which are in a hazard-prone area to reduce the risk of future 
disasters and relocate them to a safe area or have other development plans such as providing 
mixed-income neighborhoods. For example, in Bessemer, Alabama during the aftermath of 
Tropical Storm Lee in 2011, the Bessemer housing authority decided to relocate those 
complexes to a safer place to reduce future risks (Debro, 2011). However, in this process, 
detailed information about the demolition date or the exact process was not provided to 
residents, and the planning process was not cleared in ways that would allow the residents to 
be involved in the recovery process. 
2.7 Public Housing Residents’ Challenges in a Disaster Context  
The concentration of poverty in distressed public housing developments can generate 
a myriad of problems. This concentration makes residents of public housing one of the most 
socially vulnerable populations in American cities that may face significant damages in 
disasters. These damages are due to the vulnerable location of developments and the 
distressed units of public housing complexes. 
The residents of these units are renters. Like other, market-based renters they have no 
control over the restoration of their buildings. However, public housing residents face unique 
challenges in that the housing authorities are responsible for the repairs which are dependent 
on governmental funding resources. This specific housing tenure causes a long-term 
displacement for the residents of these units in the aftermath of disasters. Public housing 
residents often cannot afford temporary or permanent shelters after disasters due to lower 
income and limited access to information (Finch, Emrich, & Cutter, 2010). They also 
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experience a more extended displacement period due to the difficulties of accessing 
assistance through the bureaucratic system of compensation (Fothergill & Peek, 2004).  
Prolonged displacement limits the involvement of public housing residents in the 
decision-making regarding the recovery process. Dynamic social marginalization decreases 
the role of socially vulnerable people in the recovery decision-making process and static 
vulnerabilities limit their access to the recovery resources. The limited participation is due to 
physical displacement of the public housing residents as well as the social stigmatization of 
public housing (Hamideh & Rongerude, 2018). Racial and class-based stigmas also play a 
significant role in creating social obstacles against the recovery of public housing units.  
Hamideh and Rongerude (2018) argue that there is no predefined program for the 
permanent recovery of the public housing units and that their fate depends on the various 
political agendas present in the aftermath of disasters. For example, Graham (2012) focused 
on the case study of addressing the replacement of a public housing development with 
mixed-income complexes in the aftermath of Katrina in New Orleans. She revealed the way 
that desirable results of HOPE VI interrelated with the local organizational and historical 
circumstance. This interrelation confused the goals of housing and community developers 
regarding the provision of equity and social justice in Lafitte (Graham, 2012). Local 
governments do not have economic incentives for the reconstruction of these units and have 
significant political barriers in replacing the lost affordable units. While multi-family houses 
are business projects and private resources are the main reconstruction resources, investments 
flow where the risks are lower. Therefore, the communities that are less desirable for 
investment are left with no rehabilitation resources for multi-family housing (Kamel & 
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Loukaitou-Sideris, 2004). These limitations result in various challenges for the residents of 
public housing and slow their housing recovery in the aftermath of the disasters. 
2.8 Conclusion  
In this chapter, I reviewed pieces of literature which have focused on disaster 
recovery in three main areas including recovery policies, social vulnerability, and the 
challenges of the housing recovery. This review highlighted that disaster recovery is not an 
equal opportunity for the whole community. While some people recover fast due to their 
stronger financial and social situation, others lag. This review concluded that post-disaster 
recovery is a complex social phenomenon that housing recovery plays a crucial role in. 
Reestablishing permanent housing in the aftermath of disaster has a significant role in the 
ability of individuals to recover their normal activities and daily routines. Therefore, a delay 
in housing recovery may result in delaying the recovery of the entire community. The 
bureaucratic process of recovery and the flow of financial resources limits the housing 
recovery in disadvantaged communities that have a smaller voice in the decision-making 
process. Besides, market-based policies provide limited financial resources and cause various 
difficulties for the citizens who are not the owners of their housing units.   
A review of the works of the literature in post-disaster housing recovery showed that 
a group of researchers have focused on the role of social vulnerability factors in the housing 
recovery and some researchers also examined the differences of the recovery of different 
types of housing. The policies and resources that are established for the community recovery 
in general, as well as housing recovery as a part of the community, were explored in this 
chapter. Moreover, I reviewed the history of public housing units in addition to the policies 
that were designed for these units in the context of natural disasters. My review concluded 
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with the identification of two types of gaps in terms of the public housing recovery in the 
aftermath of disasters.  
Firstly, I found that there is a gap in the literature in terms of focusing on housing 
recovery with regards to the interconnected impacts of social vulnerability factors and the 
housing types that have no control on the reconstruction of their houses. Specifically, there 
are few studies that have explored the recovery of public housing units and the impact of 
their specific social vulnerabilities in the face of disasters and on the recovery outcomes of 
communities as a whole. Secondly, I found that even though there are predefined policies and 
resources for housing recovery, there is a gap in the policies regarding the recovery of public 
housing units that make their circumstance vulnerable to different political plans. Also, the 
bureaucratic process of recovery and the financial resources of the recovery are not clear for 
this type of residential units.  
Consequently, this thesis focuses on the challenges of the recovery of public housing 
residents through the lens of their interdependent vulnerabilities and how the existing 
recovery process and financial policies influence their recovery outcomes. In the next 
chapter, I will investigate the applied methodology of this thesis to draw out the challenges of 
the recovery of public housing units in the aftermath of a disaster using a case study. 
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CHAPTER 3.    METHODOLOGY 
This thesis attempts to examine the recovery challenges of public housing residents. 
The approach used to achieve this goal is a case study which enables an investigation of a 
contemporary phenomenon in depth to explore causation. After reviewing the disaster 
recovery literature on trajectories of recovery, inequalities in the recovery resources, and 
plans for the recovery of public housing, three gaps and subsequently three research 
questions were identified. First, what are the specific vulnerabilities of public housing 
residents in the face of disasters? Second, how do the vulnerabilities of public housing 
residents shape the outcome of the recovery of these units in the aftermath of disasters? 
Third, how do recovery funding sources, plans, and policies influence the recovery of public 
housing unit? All these three questions direct this study to investigate the main question 
which is what are the obstacles for recovery of public housing units? In order to answer these 
questions, I applied descriptive statistics and mapping method to analyze various quantitative 
and qualitative data that is elaborated on in this chapter.   
This study is part of a larger longitudinal and interdisciplinary recovery-based field 
study of Lumberton, North Carolina, conducted by the NIST-funded Center of Excellence 
(CoE) on Risk-Based Community Resilience Planning with collaborators from the National 
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). The CoE is headquartered at Colorado State 
University (CSU) in Fort Collins, Colorado and includes collaborations with engineers, 
economists, and sociologists from 12 universities across the United States including Iowa 
State University. Collectively, this team of researchers is working to understand what makes 
a community resilient – or able to bounce back – in the face of a disaster. 
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The CoE field study in Lumberton focuses on several aspects of community resilience 
following the flooding that occurred due to Hurricane Matthew. All the universities involved 
in the field study effort have signed an Internal Review Board (IRB) Authorization 
Agreement (IAA), that designates the CSU and NIST as the lead institutions for the field 
study protocol review and approval (Van de Lindt et al., 2018) (See Appendix A). 
3.1 Case Study 
A case study research is formed by identifying, describing, and analyzing a specific 
example. This research approach is instrumental when a research question is proposed, and 
perplexity exists, where there is a need for general understanding and a feeling that we can 
gain insights into the research question by investigating a specific case (Creswell & Poth, 
2018). Case study research attempts to examine a specific phenomenon in depth to explore 
causation (Yin, 2014). In this thesis, in order to investigate the challenges of recovery for 
public housing residents in the aftermath of a disaster, I chose a community in the process of 
recovering following a hurricane as a case study. I aim to have an in-depth and detailed 
exploration of public housing developments’ recovery in Lumberton in the aftermath of 
Hurricane Matthew to understand the disparities in the recovery of these residential units in 
comparison to the privately-owned units. 
In my research, I use both qualitative and mapping procedures to find the answers to 
my research questions. The analyses cover three distinct categories including an examination 
of vulnerabilities of the city and the public housing developments, correlation between these 
vulnerabilities and the outcome of recovery, and the impact of policies, financial sources, and 
plans on their recovery. These analyses are conducted using various data sources including 
the American Community Survey (ACS)-5-year estimations at block group level, survey data 
collected in two longitudinal studies of residential units’ recovery, interviews, field notes, 
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media content about Hurricane Matthew, and governmental document reviews including 
HACL’s strategic plan and a CDBG-DR action plan.  
3.2 Social Vulnerability Analysis 
To investigate the specific vulnerabilities of public housing in the wake of disasters, I 
used quantitative analysis. Thus, using the 2015 American Community Survey (ACS) 5-year 
estimation data at the block group level, I created a social vulnerability map (See Figure 4.6 
in next chapter). I used 2015 ACS data to conduct an analysis of the social vulnerability of 
the city before the occurrence of the floods which resulted from Hurricane Matthew. The 
primary objective was to find the spots of social vulnerability in the city to investigate the 
relationship between vulnerability, damages, and recovery outcomes. I chose ACS data as 
secondary source data that would provide acceptable resolution to identify the homogenous 
clusters of the socially vulnerable populations. Similarly, block-group level data was used 
because it offers an opportunity to measure a range of information about the social 
vulnerability in a sufficiently small spatial scale that represents more or less homogenous 
neighborhoods. In my research, I utilized Van Zandt et al. (2012) methodology in mapping 
social vulnerability in which I have a social vulnerability index weighted by block groups. 
To create the social vulnerability map, 17 indicators were used to identify the socially 
vulnerable populations. The indicators offered a variety of factors. Factors related to 
household structure (such as single-parent household with children), age (children below 5, 
individuals above 65, and individuals above 65 living in poverty), transportation dependence 
(have no car or rely on public transportation), housing characteristics (vacancies, mobile 
homes, group quarters), minority, poverty, educational and employment status, and language 
skills (Van Zandt et al., 2012). To simplify the comparability among block-groups and in 
every case, each of these indicators was converted to a proportion between 0 to 1 by a related 
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base. The block group’s proportion that is closer to 1 has a higher concentration of the 
vulnerable groups that display the particular characteristic of vulnerability in that block 
group.  
Table  3.1 Social Vulnerability Indicators  
Base Social Vulnerability Indicators (Percentages) 
Single parent households with children/ Total Households 
Population 5 or below/Total Population 
Population 65 or above/Total Population 
Population 65 or above & below poverty/ Pop. 65 or above 
Workers using public transportation/ Civilian pop. 16+ and employed 
Occupied housing units without a vehicle/ Occupied housing unit 
Vacant Housing units/Total housing units 
Persons in renter occupied housing units/ Total occupied housing units 
Non-white population/Total population 
Population in group quarters/Total population 
Housing units built 20 years ago/Total housing Units 
Mobile Homes/Total housing units 
Persons in poverty/Total population 
Occupied housing units without a telephone/Total occupied house unit 
Population above 25 with less than high school/Total pop above 25 
Population 16+ in labor force and unemployed/Pop in Labor force 16+ 
Population above 5 that speak English not well or not at all/Pop >5 
(Source: Van Zandt et al., 2012) 
Consequently, by adding across all these 17 indicators, I created a combined social 
vulnerability score that indicates distribution of social vulnerability within and across the 
various block-groups in a community. In order to correct these indicators to be reliable for all 
block groups with different population densities, the social vulnerability scores were 
weighted by the population density of each block-group. With this correction, it can be 
assured that there is no bias in each block-group with high social vulnerability scores and low 
populations in the block-group.  
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Finally, these scores were shown on the map of the city using Geographic 
Information System (GIS) software. All the scores were shown as a detailed Choropleth map 
in Arc-GIS including, low (0-25 percentile), medium (25-75 percentile), and high (75-100 
percentile) social vulnerability for block-groups. This social vulnerability map was overlaid 
with the location map of the public housing developments to find the relation between the 
location of these complexes and the socially vulnerable neighborhoods in the city, as well as 
investigating the specific factors that cause a social vulnerability in these developments. This 
map was also used in composition with the survey results to examine the effect of social 
vulnerability of the block-groups on the outcome of the recovery of residential units and the 
public housing units.  
3.3 Social Vulnerability Impacts on the Recovery Outcomes  
To explore the impacts of social vulnerabilities on the recovery outcome and the 
recovery of public housing in the aftermath of disasters I used both mapping and descriptive 
statistics. For this study, I applied the results of two households’ surveys that were 
implemented by CoE through two waves of a longitudinal study in December 2016, shortly 
after Hurricane Matthew and in January 2018, 14 months after the Hurricane.  
The sampling goal of the household surveys was to provide a representative sample 
of housing units and the households occupying the units in the school attendance zone for 
Lumberton Junior High which represents the study area.  
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The sampling strategy was a two-stage non-proportional stratified cluster; one 
including the penultimate sampling units using census blocks, and the other containing 
primary sampling units utilizing housing units and the households residing in the units. This 
strategy had the advantage of face-to-face surveys in a spatially separated region. Sampling 
was developed using boundary files for block and census data on the population data, 
households, race and ethnicity, and housing types gathered from U.S. census website. Using 
a probability proportion to size (PPS) random sampling procedure to select the penultimate 
sample units (blocks), blocks in high probability flooding areas selected 3 to 1 over low 
probability flooding regions. The housing units were then chosen randomly with a fixed rate 
of 8 units per block. This sampling strategy assured a representative sample of the area (Van 
de Lindt et al., 2018). 
Implementing this sampling strategy included the following steps. First, all census 
blocks that are within the school zone and within the 100-year as well as 500-year 
floodplains which were identified and supplemented by additional information regarding 
likely inundation areas within the school attendance zones. This resulted in 1,153 blocks with 
9,714 housing units identified as falling completely or intersecting with the Lumberton 
Junior High school boundary area. Of these, 323 blocks were dropped from the sample 
because they had too few housing units (< 5). Therefore, 830 blocks with 5 or more occupied 
housing units were sampled. Out of these blocks, 168 fell either entirely or partially into the 
high- or low-probability flooding areas within the school district. The remaining 662 blocks 
were outside of the focus areas. Thus, 168 blocks were within our sample frame which 
included 79 with low probability and 89 with high probability of experiencing flooding. A 
random sample of 80 blocks based on a PPS (proportion of the sampling area’s housing units 
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(HUs)), and oversampling blocks in high probability flooding areas were sampled. In the end, 
the sample included 56 census blocks in the high probability and 24 in regions with low 
probability flooding. These census blocks contained 3,617 housing units, 3,320 (91.8 %) of 
which were occupied with 297 (8.2 %) being vacant.  
Following the selection of the census blocks, the US Census data on housing units of 
the blocks were merged with Google mapping data, Google Street View, and tax portfolio 
parcel data to detect the numbers and locations of structures and identify housing units within 
structures that are in the block. Among these 80 blocks of the initial sample, a fixed number 
of eight HUs were randomly selected with an additional random selection of two HUs as 
replacements. These replacements were essential if initially selected HUs were not actual 
residential HUs or if households could not be located or surveyed (e.g., hard refusals, no 
adult, no access). 
After the field assessments were completed by the team, two census blocks were 
decided to be dropped from the high flooding probability areas: one block that was 
recognized as unsafe for teams to enter, and one block that had no housing units in contrary 
to the census data. Additionally, a number of blocks in the low probability flooding areas, 
mostly in the northern section, were well away from the inundation areas and had no risk of 
flooding. These blocks were therefore given low priority in terms of data collection since the 
overall sample provided excellent coverage of the impacted and unimpacted units. Finally, 75 
of 80 census blocks, including 54 of 56 in the high probability of flooding damage regions 
and 21 of 24 blocks in the low probability areas, were visited. 
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for the 568 random samples of residential units in 2016 to overlay this data with the social 
vulnerabilities map to investigate the damage distribution in the ArcGIS platform. 
Table  3.2 Damage description for residential units  
Damage 
State Level 
Description 
0 No damage: water may enter crawlspace or touch foundation (crawlspace 
or slab on grade) but water has no contact to electrical or plumbing, etc. in 
crawlspace, and no or limited contact with floor joists. No sewer backup 
into living area. 
1 Minor water enters house; damage to carpets, pads, baseboards, flooring. 
Approximately 25.4 mm (1 in), but no drywall damage. Touches joists. 
Could have some mold on subfloor above crawlspace. Could have minor 
sewer backup and/or minor mold issues. 
2 Drywall damage up to approximately 0.3 m (2 ft) and electrical damage, 
heater and furnace and other major equipment on floor damaged. Lower 
bathroom and kitchen cabinets damaged. Doors or windows need 
replacement. Could have major sewer backup and /or major mold issues. 
3 Substantial drywall damage, electrical panel destroyed, bathroom/kitchen 
cabinets and appliances damaged; lighting fixtures on walls destroyed; 
ceiling lighting may be ok. Studs reusable; some may be damaged. Could 
have major sewer backup and/or major mold issues. 
4 Significant structural damage present; all drywall, appliances, cabinets etc. 
destroyed. Could be floated off foundation. Building must be demolished or 
potentially replaced. 
(Source: Van de Lindt et al., 2018)  
In addition, I conducted an analysis of the relationship between social vulnerabilities 
and the sites of public housing units as well as the impact of the disaster on these units using 
ArcGIS software. Then, using the household surveys of the 568 samples from January 2018, 
I compared the recovery outcome of the public housing units with the rest of residential units 
one year after the disaster to draw out the disparities in recovery outcomes. I mapped the data 
that was collected in the 2018 household survey by the CoE team to show the housing units 
occupancy status in ArcGIS which was then overlaid with the social vulnerability map. 
Therefore, the impact of social vulnerability factors on the pace and quality of the recovery 
42 
of public housing units were investigated in comparison with other housing units in 
Lumberton.  
3.4 Qualitative Analysis 
My approach to investigate the impacts of funding, policy-making, and planning on 
the recovery of public housing was through qualitative analysis. I analyzed interviews I 
conducted with various stakeholders as well as media and various official documents’ 
content. I reviewed the media content from October 8 of 2016 to December 2019 and found 
25 relative articles. I organized the articles to gather information about the damage losses, 
financial aid allocations and distributions to the HACL, recovery policies and plans of the 
state and the city for the recovery of public housing units, and residents’ displacement and 
return to their public housing units. In addition to the media content, I reviewed the HACL 
strategic plans and the CDBG-DR action plans to identify the projects and funding 
allocations for the recovery of public housing developments. These media and official 
document reviews helped me to collect data as well as find the names of the critical 
stakeholders, governmental agencies, non-profits, advocates, and charities that were involved 
in the recovery of public housing developments.  
This media review provided me with a purposive list of the public housing recovery 
key actors that I needed to interview in order to obtain detailed information on how local 
officials and stakeholders addressed the recovery of public housing units and what they 
defined as the challenges for the recovery of these units. These participants were contacted 
through emails and phone calls based on their involvement in the recovery efforts and their 
job titles. My qualitative interviews were conducted in December 2018 with 14 community 
leaders and key stakeholders including local officials and non-profits in Lumberton (See 
Appendix B). These interviews were done as a part of the CoE study and were funded by the 
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NIST Center of Excellence. Each of the interviewees was informed about the goal of the 
project at the beginning of the interview and was asked to sign a consent form (See Appendix 
C). 
The interviews were conducted using a semi-structured interview guide (See 
Appendix D) that asked questions about the affordable housing needs, damage and 
displacement assessments, recovery plans and their progress, funding resources, and the 
recovery obstacles for public housing developments. The questions were open-ended to give 
the interviewees the opportunity to share their information without any restriction. The 
interviews were all conducted face-to-face, except for one that was conducted via phone, and 
lasted between 45 minutes to 100 minutes. Thirteen interviews were audio recorded, with one 
not recorded due to the interviewee declining the request to be recorded, and complimented 
with the field notes. These interviews provided significant real numbers of the damages, 
displaced families, funding allocation and disbursed money, as well as an excellent insight 
into the obstacles of public housing recovery.  
All the interviews with local authorities and officials were transcribed and uploaded 
into Atlas.ti for the qualitative analysis. This coding helped me to reduce the massive amount 
of data to focus on more in-depth and nuanced insights. I coded the data in order to move 
toward a specific understanding of social vulnerabilities of public housing residents, their 
recovery outcome, and the differences of their recovery in comparison with the other 
residential units. I developed a coding system such as what Saldana (2016) describes as 
categories and subcategories to push my codes to a conceptual one. I categorized the codes 
into four significant groups based on my research questions including social vulnerability, 
disaster impact, recovery outcome, and recovery disparities. Each of these code groups 
44 
included some detailed codes that all together produced the insight into the relations and 
patterns in the data to have a coherent story of the challenges. The final list of codes consists 
of four major categories, and 36 subcategories in order to best describe the data (See 
Appendix E). This coding system provided an overview of the data and an insight of the gaps 
in funding, policy-making, and planning for the recovery of the public housing units and how 
these gaps had impacts on the recovery outcomes of public housing units.  
Additionally, I conducted interviews with seven public housing residents whom their 
units were damaged by the floods in the aftermath of Hurricane Matthew to explore their 
specific vulnerabilities. These interviews were conducted in April 2019. Each of the 
interviewees was informed about the goal of the project at the beginning of the interview and 
was asked to sign a consent form (See Appendix F). The interviews were conducted using a 
semi-structured interview guide (See Appendix G) that asked questions about the 
displacement and recovery experience of public housing residents. The interviews were 
conducted face-to-face and lasted between 15 minutes to 45 minutes. The interviews were all 
audio recorded, but were not coded. These interviews provided significant real challenges of 
displaced families, as well as an excellent insight into the vulnerabilities of public housing 
residents.  
3.5 Limitations 
This study did not face significant challenges or limitations. However, there was no 
access to the detailed information about the sociodemographic characteristics of the public 
housing tenants. Therefore, the weighted social vulnerability index could not be considered 
for public housing developments separately. In addition, there was no possibility to have 
interviews with the public housing residents whom their units got significant damages and 
were sent to other housing authorities to be rehoused. This was due to the fact that the 
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housing authority does not keep documentation of them. However, I had discussions with 
seven public housing tenants who were rehoused in the public housing developments within 
Lumberton whom were not significantly flooded by Hurricane Matthew.  
In the next chapter, I will elaborate on the results of the analysis to outline the 
challenges of the recovery of public housing units in Lumberton in the aftermath of 
Hurricane Matthew. In the first section, I will provide a background of the case study. I will 
then, show the vulnerability maps and how vulnerabilities impact on damages and the 
recovery outcomes. The analysis of the interviews is also provided. Finally, I will discuss the 
findings of this study. 
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initially used for the river which comes from an indigenous word that means “black water” 
(Van de Lindt et al., 2018). The river is a National Wild and Scenic River according to the 
North Carolina General Assembly and is a part of the North Carolina Natural and Scenic 
River System. It is believed that Native Americans may have lived in the region since 20,000 
B.C. and the river and its swamps were the homes of several displaced Native American 
tribes of the coastal region as Europeans advanced westward. Lumber River is classified as a 
natural, scenic, and recreational site. Recreational activities include canoeing, boating, 
hunting, fishing, and picnicking, and the areas is also home to several archaeological sites 
(City of Lumberton, n.d.). 
According to the United States Census Bureau, Lumberton spans 15.8 square miles 
and has a population of 21,707. Lumberton is a diverse community with 39% non-Hispanic 
White, 36.7% non-Hispanic Black, and 12.7% Native American population, according to 
2015 5-year ACS estimates.  
 
Figure  4.2 Racial and ethnic composition in Lumberton, NC based on 2010 Census data. 
The city of Lumberton is considered as a “minority-majority community” (Van de 
Lindt et al., 2018) that may follow the general pattern of minority status in the U.S. in which 
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36.7%
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racial or ethnic standing are disproportionately correlated with poverty and unemployment. 
According to 2015 5-year ACS estimates, in Lumberton, 34.8% of the population lives at or 
below poverty levels, and the median household income is $31,245 which is 62% of the 
median household income of the North Carolina State (which is currently $50,584). 
According to the 2017 Housing Authority of City of Lumberton (HACL) annual plan, 53.3% 
of renters spend 30% or more of their income on rent, which means people were rent 
burdened prior to Hurricane Matthew.  
4.1.1 Public Housing in Lumberton 
HACL is located in Lumberton in Robeson County. It was established in 1949 to 
provide safe, clean, and affordable housing to low-income citizens with assistance to improve 
the quality of their lives. HACL is managed as a governmental unit, and is 
commissioned under N.C.G.S., the North Carolina General Statutes, statute 157 (Housing 
Authority of the City of Lumberton, n.d.). Under this statute, the mayor of 
Lumberton assigns a Board of Commissioners for HACL per state law. Currently, the seven-
member board of commissioners serve five-year terms. At least one of the seven members 
must be a resident of the public housing units owned and managed by HACL. The board of 
commissioners are responsible for setting policy and to choosing the Executive Director. The 
board also has a day-to-day responsibility to guarantee that HACL works in compliance with 
HUD rules, regulations, and relevant state and local laws (Housing Authority of the City of 
Lumberton, n.d.). HACL is funded primarily through the U.S. Department of Housing and 
Urban Development (HUD). The office was previously located in Hilton Heights, which is 
one of the developments in King street. However, after being flooded during Hurricane 
Matthew, the office moved temporarily to a city government property located near the City 
Hall.   
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Before Hurricane Matthew, Lumberton had 729 public housing units in twelve 
developments that were all leased (HACL, 2017). The interim director of the Lumberton 
Housing Authority in 2016, Lemark Harris, believed that HACL was the largest housing 
authority in Robeson County (Shiles, 2017). Local officials who were interviewed for this 
study stated that Lumberton had 1,200 households on the waiting list for the section 8 
housing vouchers. HACL had less than 596 activated vouchers before the floods, of which 
450 were used by families for their housing. Figure 4.3 shows the location of the twelve 
developments in the city’s school zone boundary. The information about each of the twelve 
complexes and their units are shown in tables 4.1 and 4.2 respectively. Table 4.1 shows that 
all the developments had been built more than 30 years ago. Two of the complexes were built 
more than 60 years ago which included 123 of the city’s public housing units. Among these 
12 complexes, two developments including Hilton Heights and Myers Park, which housed 72 
units, are located in the 100-year floodplain area (HACL, 2017).  
 
Figure  4.3 Public housing development in the school zone of Lumberton prepared by the 
author. 
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In Figure 4.3, each number represents one development. This is further detailed in 
Table 4.1. The table provides the information of each of the developments in terms of names, 
numbers of units, addresses and the year in which the complex had been built. Table 4.2 
shows details about the units in terms of the number of bedrooms per units. 
Table  4.1 Public housing complexes in Lumberton. 
NO HACL properties in 
Lumberton 
Total Units Year 
Built 
Address 
1 THE MEADOWS 40 1984 Meadow View Rd. 
2 THE MEADOWS Ext. 24 1989 Meadow View Rd. 
3 DAVIS HEIGHTS 60 1974 Turner Place 
4 EASTWOOD TERRACE 50 1968 Eastwood Terrace 
5 ROZIER HOMES 30 1950’s S Seneca St. 
6 HILTON HEIGHTS 42 1979 King St. 
7 MOHR PLAZA 100 1975 North Martin Luther King Dr. 
8 TURNER TERRACE 100 1973 Spruce St. 
9 LUMBEE HOMES 93 1950’s Lee Circle 
10 MYERS PARK 30 1974 Arnold St. 
11 TUDOR COURT 60 1974 West Dr. 
12 WEAVER COURT 100 1968 Parmele Ave. 
 Total Units 729   
(Source: HACL Archive) 
Table  4.2 HACL units’ details 
HACL Units Units % of Total Units 
0 Bedroom 23 3.1 
1 Bedroom 154 21.1 
2 Bedrooms 234 32.1 
3 Bedrooms 218 29.9 
4 Bedrooms 85 11.7 
5 Bedrooms 15 2.1 
Handicapped 36 4.9 
Sight and Hearing 15 2.1 
Total Units 729  
(Source: HACL Archive) 
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According to the 2017 HUD’s public housing resident characteristics report6 which 
was published after the Hurricane Matthew, HACL currently has 504 households in which 
1244 tenants live. This means the average household size of the residents is 2.5 per unit. Half 
of the residents are below the age of 18, and 7% are above 61 years old. HACL tenants’ race 
and poverty composition are shown in the following figures 4.4 and 4.5. In 2017, all of the 
tenants except one were non-Hispanic, based on the ethnicity of the household head. The 
majority of the residents are either African-American or Native American and are extremely 
low-income.  
 
 
Figure  4.4 Racial composition of public housing units in Lumberton, NC based on 2017 
HUD report. 
                                                 
6 Retrieved from https://pic.hud.gov/pic/RCRPublic/rcrmain.asp 
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Figure  4.5 Average annual income of public housing residents in Lumberton, NC based on 
HUD report. 
 
4.1.2 Impacts of Hurricane Matthew 
Lumberton was one of the devastated communities in North Carolina due to the 
flooding in the aftermath of Hurricane Matthew. The Lumber River water level rose on 
October 8th because of the heavy rain caused by Hurricane Matthew. Water and electricity 
services were disrupted in Lumberton immediately after the flood (Van de Lindt et al., 2018). 
Electrical power was completely restored by December 9th and water services was not fully 
resumed until October 15th, 2017.  
In Lumberton, many of the residential units were damaged due to the floods induced 
by the Hurricane. The 2017 CDBG action plan for the State of North Carolina stated that 876 
houses in Lumberton had sustained major to severe damages (State of North Carolina, 2017). 
These significant damages resulted in the displacement of a large number of individuals in 
the state. In the media, it was reported that 1400 individuals from Robeson County were 
sheltered at the height of the emergency phase (Futch, 2017). Reports showed that 355 
77%
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Very Low Income
Low Income
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families remained displaced even four months after the floods had receded. These displaced 
families were sheltered in hotels across the Robeson and Cumberland counties (Futch, 2017). 
Around 35% of the public housing stock was affected by the floods (Dorsey, 2017). 
According to HACL information, 267 households of the 355 displaced families in Lumberton 
were residents of public housing units, which included 725 individuals (HACL, 2017). Some 
of these families were sheltered in the hotels and motels in Lumberton, Laurinburg, 
Fayetteville, Rowland, Charlotte, Spring Lake, and Durham, and some of them were 
sheltered by their relatives. Many of these families remained displaced for about six months 
after the Hurricane. HACL administrative office explained in their interviews that they only 
had shelter information documentation on 82 families including 246 individuals in the 
aftermath of the Hurricane. The rest may have found other housing options in other housing 
authorities around the county or other housing options for which HACL did not follow their 
activities anymore. HACL ceased tracking those residents who found a permanent house in 
other housing authorities.  
 HACL had estimates of the damages totaling $8 million, with approximately $5 
million in remaining unmet needs by November, 2017 7 (State of North Carolina, 2017). 
According to the 2017 HACL report, 145 units out of the 267 damaged units were covered 
by insurance, while the rest of the units did not have any flood insurance coverage. Among 
those insured units, 112 units suffered significant damages and 33 suffered minor damages. 
Considering that HACL had 729 housing units available before Hurricane and 276 of those 
were damaged by the floods, HACL retained 462 available housing units for lease after the 
                                                 
7 Unmet needs are defined as necessary expenses and serious needs that are unmet through insurance or 
other means (State of North Carolina, 2017) 
54 
hurricane, which still made this authority the largest housing authority in Robeson County 
(Shiles, 2017). 
4.1.3 Resources and Policies for the Recovery 
In an interview published in local media, HACL Executive Director, Adrian Lowery 
stated that FEMA was providing 75% of funds for HACL recovery projects through public 
assistance aid. The rest of the funds were to be allocated by the state government to restore 
the public housing units (Hunter, 2017). In August 2017, HACL director declared that FEMA 
had allocated $13 million of funds to HACL for the recovery programs. FEMA approved 
funding for the 16 public assistance projects HACL had requested aid for in order to facilitate 
the recovery work. HACL Executive Director stated that the members of HACL Board of 
Commissioners and FEMA representatives had a meeting in which HACL was declared 
eligible for $13 million in recovery assistance. The director also announced that this money 
would be reimbursed to the housing authority. Reimbursement meant that HACL was 
responsible to spend money on debris removal, hazard mitigation, and recovery projects, and 
would receive the allocated fund after completing FEMA’s audit at the end of each of the 
projects (Shiles, 2017b).  
 In addition to FEMA funds, insurance also covered $3 million of the reconstruction 
projects (Reeves, 2017). Moreover, the State of North Carolina in the CDBG-DR action plan 
allocated $5 million to HACL for the unmet needs of the public housing development in 
Lumberton. In this situation, unmet needs were defined as necessary expenses and serious 
needs that are unmet through insurance or other means (The State of North Carolina, 2017).  
In terms of recovery plans, HACL planned for the aftermath of Hurricane Matthew to 
relocate two developments, Myers Park and Hilton Heights which housed 72 apartments, 
outside of the 100-year floodplain. Therefore, for more than two years after the floods, 
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HACL scheduled Myers Park and Hilton Heights as “off-line”8 and made the 72 units vacant. 
Offline units are excluded units from the leasing list with HUD approval because of their 
vacancy due to natural disaster or casualty loss, market conditions, etc. In addition, HACL 
planned to develop three of the complexes, Mohr Plaza, Turner Terrace, and Weaver Court, 
with a deconcentration policy for development. Deconcentration is a policy that was ruled by 
HUD in 1999 to assure fair housing and eliminating poverty concentration in public housing 
developments. In this policy, HUD required public housing agencies to decide an overall 
average income for the households of their developments; describe each building as higher 
income or lower income based on the average income in the building; and admit lower 
income households to higher income units and higher income families to lower income 
buildings. Public housing developments which house only elderly persons or persons with 
disabilities, or both, are exempted from this policy (HUD, 2001). Therefore, Mohr Plaza was 
excluded from this plan due to the condition of its residents whom were disabled and elderly. 
In the HACL 5-year plan, Lumbee homes was also planned to be modernized and renovated 
to have physical and management improvements (HACL, 2017).  
The mentioned allocations and plans may seem perfect for the recovery of the public 
housing units in terms of having plans and funds, however, two years after the hurricane, 182 
out of 267 damaged public housing units are still abandoned or not repaired. This delay in the 
recovery was investigated by interviews that were conducted with the administrators of 
housing authority of the city of Lumberton and other local officials. Findings from the 
interviews will be further discussed in the third research question’s section. 
                                                 
8 https://www.hud.gov/program_offices/public_indian_housing/systems/pic/faq/dev 
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4.2 Findings: Response to Research Questions 
In the following sections, the analysis and findings related to the research sub-
questions are explored. These findings help this research to outline the obstacles of public 
housing recovery. First, I examine the specific vulnerabilities of public housing residents in 
the face of disasters. Second, I explore the relationship between the vulnerabilities of public 
housing residents and the damages as well as recovery of these units in the aftermath of 
disasters. Third, I examine the impacts of funding sources, plans, and policies on the 
recovery of public housing units. 
4.2.1 First Research Sub-Question: Social Vulnerability and Public Housing 
The purpose of the first research question was to investigate the specific social 
vulnerabilities of the public housing residents. Using Van Zandt and co. (2012) methodology, 
a social vulnerability map was produced. Lumberton is a poor community, not only in 
Robeson County and North Carolina, but also in comparison to the nation at large. According 
to the 2015, 5-year ACS estimation, 52.3% of the residents of Lumberton are renters which is 
a relatively large percentage of renters. The majority of the houses in this city are located in 
the old structures since only 10% of the units have been built since the year 2000.  
The population is densely located in the central part of Lumberton. However, 
minority renters with school children are concentrated in the southern parts of the city (Van 
de Lindt et al., 2018). Not surprisingly, the city is a socially vulnerable community, where 
the majority of the block groups have a weighted social vulnerability index with medium to 
high scores (See Figure 4.6). The analysis shows housing tenure, race, poverty, and age of 
the housing units make up the largest portion of the social vulnerability scores in the block 
groups of Lumberton.  
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The high percentage of old structures increase the probability of high percentages of 
damages in the face of disasters. The combination of high poverty with a high percentage of 
minority populations indicates the possibility of being impacted by disasters 
disproportionately in terms of damages and displacement as well as having difficulties in 
overcoming these impacts in post-disaster contexts. Also, a higher proportion of rental 
housing does create the potential for generating larger displaced populations whom have 
serious challenges finding temporary and permanent housing.  
Figure 4.6 displays the weighted social vulnerability composite measures overlaid 
with the public housing complexes map to identify the relationship between the social 
vulnerability of the city and these complexes. The map displays that the majority of public 
housing units are concentrated in the socially vulnerable block groups in the city.  
 
Figure  4.6 Social vulnerability in block group level with the public housing developments 
location prepared by the author. 
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Based on the social vulnerability map and the developments’ location, 273 units of 
the public housing developments are located in the neighborhoods with high social 
vulnerability and 224 units in the block groups with the medium weighted index scores, as 
indicated by dark red on the map. Therefore, around 68% of the public housing units are in 
neighborhoods with medium and high social vulnerability. 
Surprisingly, four of the developments including Hilton Heights, Myers Park, Mohr 
Plaza, and Tudor Court, with a total of 232 units, are located in block groups with low social 
vulnerability. However, these complexes are located in the poorest region of the city based 
on the field observation and interviews. Closer inspection of the results shows that the raw 
score of social vulnerability in this block group is high. Nonetheless, the population density 
is low in this region because of the broad area of this block group.  
This combination of findings shows that the high proportion of rental units, 
minorities, and poverty in the block groups of public housing developments have the 
potential of increasing difficulties for the residents in terms of overcoming disaster impacts. 
These findings show that these block groups have the possibility of creating a large displaced 
population who have difficulties with finding temporary housing and full recovery. It was 
mentioned before that half of the residents of public housing development are children. This 
means that the block groups with public housing developments have challenges with the 
evacuation and providing day care services to the impacted families in post-disaster context. 
Moreover, dislocation of the public housing residents and their children may have negative 
effects on school and community recovery in disaster contexts.  
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4.2.2 Second Research Sub-Question: Impacts of Vulnerability on the Damages and 
Recovery 
The second research question aims to investigate the impacts of public housing 
residents’ social vulnerabilities on their housing damages as well as their overall recovery 
outcomes. In order to explore the second research question, this study used the data of two 
CoE field study waves in Lumberton in 2016, right after Hurricane Matthew, and in 2018, 
about fourteen months after the hurricane. These sets of data include damage assessments of 
the sampled structure losses in the aftermath of the floods and the household recovery 
surveys in 2018, in which the status of the sampled units in terms of recovery, repair, or 
abandonment are provided. 
The map of damage losses and social vulnerability are overlaid to investigate the 
relationship between social vulnerability and the damage loss of the residential units and the 
public housing developments. Figure 4.7 displays the distribution of damaged homes on the 
map in which different colors show the levels of damage. Based on the map, most of the 
damaged homes, around 84%, are concentrated in block groups with medium or high social 
vulnerability. According to the sampled residential units, around 68% of privately owned and 
36% of public housing units suffered moderate to severe losses.  
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Figure  4.7 Damage assessment of the residential units with the social vulnerability map 
prepared by the author. 
 
Similar to the above damage assessment map, the recovery map is overlaid with the 
social vulnerability map. This map was prepared based on the status of the residential sample 
in January of 2018 shown in Figure 4.8. Based on the map, 85% of abandoned units are 
located in block groups with medium or high social vulnerability. Additionally, a third of the 
damaged units are still not repaired fourteen months after Hurricane Matthew, and 81% of 
these unrepaired units are located in block groups with medium or high vulnerability. Based 
on the sampled units, fourteen months after the floods, two-thirds of the public housing units 
remained abandoned, whereas a third of damaged privately-owned units were still vacant. 
This abandonment percentage is based on the sampled units’ status. 
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Figure  4.8 Recovery outcome with the social vulnerability map prepared by the author. 
 
The high percentage of abandoned and unrepaired units have negative impacts on the 
low-income housing stock in the city. Also, the lengthy and protracted housing recovery 
results in longer dislocations that have negative impacts on the displaced families and can 
even result in the failure of local businesses. This may affect the social and economic aspects 
of community recovery and cause additional delays in community rebounding in post-
disaster contexts.  
In addition to the abandoned sampled units, there are also some evacuated apartments 
in these 12 developments based on HACL documents and the field observations. There are 
72 public housing units which have been considered as off-line during the past two years 
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after the floods. While these units are not located in the socially vulnerable neighborhoods, 
they are in the 100-year floodplain areas. These units were abandoned after Hurricane 
Matthew to be relocated to a safe site in terms of floodplain areas in order to mitigate future 
flood risks. However, two years after abandonment, these units have not yet been relocated. 
This means that 72 individual households were displaced for an uncertain length of time. 
This dislocation has negative impacts on the displaced families whom lost their local 
networks and resources.  
 Based on the interviews with HACL administrators in December 2018, two years 
after Hurricane Matthew, only 85 of the 267 damaged units are restored and less than 50% of 
the displaced residents have returned to Lumberton. From those 267 damaged units, 182 
apartments have still not recovered. Fourteen of these were damaged again two years after 
Hurricane Matthew by the floods induced by Hurricane Florence in September 2018.  
4.2.3 Third Research Sub-Question: Impacts of Funding Resources and Policies on the 
Public Housing Recovery 
The purpose of the third question is to explore the impacts of policies, plans, and 
funding sources on the recovery outcomes of public housing residents. Several financial 
resources and plans were considered for the recovery of public housing complexes in the 
aftermath of Hurricane Matthew. These funding resources were announced in the media and 
the plans for the recovery and the development of public housing complexes were announced 
in official documents such as HACL annual plans. This study analyzes these financial 
resources and plans to investigate their impact on public housing recovery outcomes. Part of 
this investigation involved interviews which were conducted with local officials and 
stakeholders in Lumberton to explore the recovery outcomes and magnify the challenges 
facing HACL in the recovery of these units. The interviews were transcribed and coded with 
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ATLAS.ti. Hence, the codes memos have been written based on the research questions. The 
codes memos shaped the findings of the third question and also added context, transparency, 
and reliability to the discussions of the first and second research questions.  
In interviews with local officials and recovery stakeholders, the first set of questions 
were about the interviewees’ assessment of affordable housing in Lumberton. The overall 
response to this question was negative. The interviewees were concerned about the shortage 
of affordable housing stocks in the city. They mentioned the city’s poverty and specifically 
the racial composition in their conversations. One of the interviewees believed that while 
many of their citizens are dependent on governmental assisted housing there is not a 
sufficient number of units for housing them. The Program Manager of the Department of 
Social Services mentioned that:  
“We are a very poor county, so lots of families depend on government housing, 
subsidized housing. There's always been a wait list, as long as I can remember.” 
The long waitlist of governmental assisted housing and the great number of public 
housing units in the city show the needs for affordable housing in the city. One of the other 
interviewees stated that:  
“Public housing is the same to me as affordable housing. It was not sufficient for the 
area. So, it was already a problem with affordable housing. […] So as far as public housing 
affordable housing, for Robeson County, for the city of Lumberton, there was not a sufficient 
amount of affordable housing. The public housing units, for a particular area especially due 
to the fact that we are one of the poorest or poverty-stricken counties not only in North 
Carolina, but in the United States of America. And where that plays in Lumberton and 
Robeson County is a unique place, where first of all there's the diversity of the culture. 
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Native American, Caucasian, African-American at one time it was almost 33%, 33%, 33%. 
So, it's almost, it's all a little project in itself based on a diversity our community ….” 
The interviewees provided this study with some information about the damages to the 
public housing units in the aftermath of Hurricane Matthew. They mentioned that most of the 
public housing units which were damaged in the floods were located in the southern and 
western parts of the city, the poor regions of Lumberton. They believed that those units were 
also inside or close to the 100-year floodplain areas. These considerable damages resulted in 
the displacement of the public housing families for a long time after Hurricane Matthew. For 
example, Barbara Brown, one of the displaced public housing residents informed media 
about her experience. She is one of the HACL commissioners and was displaced for four 
months in the aftermath of Hurricane Matthew. She stated in the media and in this study’s 
interview that:  
"I feel better about it, but I will never ever go back to the new units [restored units] 
because of that, because of the water, the flood that I saw! Right now, when I go to that area, 
I get a little teary-eyed, but where I am now, they have me across town” (Reeves, 2017). 
The displaced families were sheltered in motels and hotels in Lumberton and 
neighboring cities. In literature, it has been found that it is hard for the socially vulnerable 
population to find a temporary housing due to the fact that they have limited access to the 
resources. It was believed that they cannot apply for the financial aids because of their 
limited education. In this study, it was found that the Department of Social Services (DSS) 
helped this community with their application, while they did not use the received money for 
their temporary shelter due to their poverty or lack of knowledge in using their assisted 
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money for its defined purpose. This caused some challenges for the city to help them find 
temporary housing.  
For example, Kathy Talor is one of the displaced public housing residents. Sha lived 
in a motel for four months after Hurricane Matthew flooded her apartment. She stated in 
media that finding a new home isn't easy for her and she was displaced until the interview 
date, because:  
"One, they're full. Two, they're too far. Where FEMA sends me, they're too far, and 
they're expensive (Fodera, 2017)."  
The Program Director of the Department of Social Services mentioned the chronic 
poverty of the socially vulnerable population and the limited shelter financial assistance. She 
stated that:  
“They have money, they work, but they don't have money to start over. They have 
money to continue paying their rent, like they were currently doing, and their light bills. They 
don't have money to pay first month’s rent, deposit and all that.” 
One of the managers of North Carolina Baptists mentioned the limited ability of this 
cohort in spending their money in an appropriate way. He stated that:  
“They just spend for today. [They usually say] My rent's due next week. It's going to 
be four hundred dollars. I've got three hundred and fifty now, but there's a sale on a flat 
screen TV. Let's go get that TV. I [interviewee] see that all the time. Everything is day to 
day.” 
HACL also faced many challenges in rehousing those displaced families due to the 
fact that the recovery plans for these units were open to the policies of HUD. HUD’s current 
policy is aiming to change the public housing units to Rental Assistance Demonstration 
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(RAD).  Congress authorized RAD as a voluntary HUD’s program in 2012 to examine a new 
method of meeting the growing capital improvement needs of the old public housing units 
and preserve the HUD’s programs of Rental Supplement, Rental Assistance Payment, and 
Moderate Rehabilitation. This program allows public housing agencies to reduce the public 
and private debts and reinvest in the public housing stocks without depending on additional 
money from Congress. This is critical for HUD because of the $25.6 billion backlog of 
public housing capital improvements. The RAD policy aims to move physical units to a 
Section 8 platform with a long-term contract which should be renewed by law. In this 
program, housing authorities are provided with the opportunity to replace the public housing 
units with the voucher programs. Nevertheless, in Lumberton, HACL could not offer many 
of these families with the section 8 vouchers due to the fact that these families cannot afford 
even the subsidized rent with vouchers. As the Executive Director of HACL said: 
“So, what's unique about us in the city of Lumberton is [that] not only have we been 
here with Matthew. Then we were hit with Florence and on top of that we've got HUD 
making a big push to get rid of housing units. […] Well, we don't want to convert to RAD not 
necessarily [because of] existing units. And here's my question. That person that I've got 
[who has] lived over ten years in Turner Terrace right now that can only afford to pay 50 
dollars a month rent. Am I going to find a fifty-dollar vouchers? [No]. What happens to 
them?! In Louisville, Kentucky, in New York in those areas, Resources abound. Robeson 
County resources don't abound!” 
Therefore, HACL attempted to rehouse these families by finding them other public 
housing units in other housing authorities with available housing choice voucher units around 
the county or the state. Then, HACL attempted to rehab the units, demolishing the units 
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which were flooded twice, first by Hurricane Matthew in 2016 and then by Hurricane 
Florence in 2018, and relocating two developments to maintain the public housing stock in 
the city. Moreover, the Executive Director of HACL mentioned that in order to modernize 
the 93 units of Lumbee Homes, HACL may take RAD into consideration if they were to be 
provided with enough funding.    
HACL has another challenge in the public housing recovery process in terms of 
reimbursing the financial assistance provided by FEMA. For example, HACL announced in 
December 2018 that FEMA only reimbursed $3.5 million of the $13 million promised 
money. Based on FEMA policies of funding reimbursement, the recovery of the public 
housing units has to be aligned with mitigation purposes. The housing authority has to 
improve the condition of the units in terms of mitigating future risks. In this regard, the 
interviewees discussed the necessity of mitigation plans such as elevation. However, in some 
developments it is not economical to elevate the units and it might be better to relocate them 
to an area outside the floodplains. The Planning Director and Flood Plain Administrator of 
the city stated that:  
“I think there are seven [twelve] public housing developments in Lumberton that are 
owned by the housing authority. Of those seven, two of them didn't come back after Matthew. 
One was a two-story development called Hilton Heights, and the other was single level 
duplexes that is Meyers Park. […] We looked at Hilton Heights, we looked at the elevations, 
the ground elevations versus the required elevations for building units and there is about a 
four-foot discrepancy. So, if you were to try to redevelop Hilton Heights for example it would 
not be economical to try and elevate those existing two-story buildings. As old as they are 
and the bottom floor is on a slab, it would be very difficult and cost prohibitive to try and 
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raise that. If you were to demolish them and start from ground up, you would need to bring in 
about four feet of fill dirt to elevate the ground and that is cost prohibitive. So, it's probably 
best for that to wind up being green space of some type. The downside of that is that they lost 
however many units were in Hilton Heights. Meyers Park on the flip side is a single level. 
When we checked elevations there you would only have to elevate the ground about eighteen 
inches to be able to build which is a foot and a half, not much. So, we've got some ideas of 
how to deal with that.” 
As mentioned, in addition to the mentioned mitigation solutions, the city decided to 
relocate two of the developments to an area outside the floodplain. This decision was met 
with many challenges in the past two years. The housing authority has had some limitation in 
terms of finding a site which meets the criteria of the city. For example, if HACL decides to 
move these units to another part of town where it is not in the floodplain, they have to 
consider the limitation of having too many public housing units within a quarter mile radius. 
HACL suggested three possible sites to the North Carolina Department of Emergency 
Management to have them conduct environmental studies and evaluation on these sites and 
in order for the sites to be considered for the CDBG-DR funds. However, there is still no 
decision made on these possible sites more than two years after Hurricane Matthew, delaying 
the recovery process. HACL’s Executive Director said: 
“We have an ongoing contract as far as engineering and quality control at Raleigh. 
When we did the application, we had to have someone (an engineer CEO) to estimate the 
cost. That’s the first thing we have to do for the application of the CDBG-DR money. They 
help us to do the project cost estimate and put the name of the CEO engineer on it and ask 
them to sign up on it. They signed it on August [2018]. They helped us with the cost, with the 
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design, with the site. […] We sent the application to North Carolina Department of 
Emergency Management. The State did their own resilience recovery redevelopment plan. 
We just attached on to it.” 
Limited resources for the housing authority of the city of Lumberton resulted in a 
delay in the recovery of public housing units in addition to the bureaucratic process of 
relocation. The Executive Director of HACL believes that the funding allocated for recovery 
of the units by FEMA reimbursement is not sufficient and is calculated based on unreal 
assumptions by FEMA. He said:  
“We're going to receive [Money] for Hilton Heights. $800,000 the state portion of it. 
from FEMA we're going to get $2.4 million. That's what we work for! we signed a contract 
with FEMA saying we're going to rebuild these outside the flood zone and we can't get a 
penny anymore from what FEMA [promised,] $2,430,766.  
We're estimating that the cost to rebuild the 42 units is going to be 8 million dollars. Our 
insurance that we collected was $1 million. 1 M plus 2 million is 3 million, 3 million minus 
$8M is $5M. that’s what we estimated [we have less] for Hilton Heights! Now, did we 
estimate high? Yes [Sarcastic]! $125 per square foot. But if you want to build something new 
right now on here in Lumberton would be $ 150-265 per square foot.” 
One of the issues mentioned in literature in terms of reducing the marginalization of 
socially vulnerable population is to involve their representatives in the recovery planning 
process. This can help to improve the vulnerabilities and plan for the resilience of that 
community. It can be inferred from the quote that HACL or the county did not have any 
inclusive participation in the state recovery planning process. The state planned for the 
resilience recovery and the HACL plan has been attached to it. A similar finding was also 
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reported by Hamideh and Rongerude (2018). It is found that public housing advocates have 
little voice in recovery planning and decision-making, and they have little influence in the 
local recovery debates. 
Housing authorities relied on the governmental funding for their recovery programs. 
This reliance can be seen as an important determinant of recovery outcomes since it was 
mentioned by the interviewees. It is found that the CDBG-DR fund had not yet been received 
by HACL in December 2018. The Executive Director of HACL stated that while HUD 
claimed that the promised CDBG-DR money was sent to the State of North Carolina, HACL 
has not received the funds yet, two years after the Hurricane. Therefore, the interviewees 
were asked about the CDBG-DR and other recovery funds and the priorities for spending the 
allocated money. In the conversations, the local officials mentioned the flexibility and 
discretion of local jurisdictions in spending CDBG in North Carolina. This means that the 
state has spent more of the CDBG on infrastructure instead of affordable housing for low-
moderate income. They believed the policy of the state of North Carolina in the aftermath of 
Hurricane Matthew is similar to their policy in normal condition. The state directs the flow of 
money to the infrastructure rehabilitation and improvement instead of housing recovery of 
low-moderate income residents. They believed that this might be a good mitigation strategy 
to improve infrastructure. However, in the poor communities such as Lumberton it may 
cause many challenges in terms of providing affordable housing for the low-income people. 
The interviews highlighted the low voice of Lumberton in the state decision-makings. As the 
Executive Director of HACL said:  
“When all the money was taken from housing and put in the infrastructure who did it 
impact [hurt]? it impacted low-income and disabled individuals. One of the officials 
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somewhere in the state of North Carolina made this decision. […] Robeson County was 
getting $400,000 every three years to provide housing. All that money goes to the 
infrastructure now! So, there's no money going in the housing. Guess where the 
infrastructure money goes to? Did they go to the poor areas? No, they don't! The probable 
place go in North Carolina is Charlotte, Raleigh, Wilmington, Asheville. If you look at the 
way money spent is, it goes to the more populated area. The rural areas are getting less and 
less of the pie because they have the least amount of voice. who's standing up when CDBG 
housing money that helps low-income individuals, senior citizens, when I was saying it's 
taken out and put in infrastructure, who stand up and scream it from the mountain tops? 
Nobody.” 
In addition to the priority changes of the CDBG-DR money, the interviewees 
highlighted the time-consuming process of providing financial sources for the housing 
projects. The bureaucratic process results in a delay in the recovery of public housing units. 
The City Manager stated that: 
“If you were applying for housing under CDBG, then that application has to go to the 
county, to the state, to HUD in Washington and they review it and approve it. […] By the 
time you send it [application] to the state and to FEMA or to CDBG, it's just a time-
consuming process.”  
4.3 Discussion 
Findings show that the majority of public housing developments in Lumberton are 
located in neighborhoods with medium to high social vulnerability. Regarding the weighted 
social vulnerability index scores, housing tenure, race, and poverty are the principal 
vulnerabilities of the residents of public housing units. This study finds that the concentration 
of poverty in distressed units of public housing developments which locate in socially 
vulnerable neighborhoods make this cohort of the community vulnerable in the face of 
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extreme shocks. The poverty of the residents and limited maintenance efforts of housing 
authorities force these community to be in risk of great damages. The high number of 
damaged units in the public housing developments show the impacts of vulnerabilities on the 
amounts of damage caused by disasters. This cohort disproportionately faced damages and 
displacement. The shortage of public housing stocks results in the lengthy displacement of 
these households.  
 As mentioned in the literature review, social vulnerability can affect the ability of a 
community in terms of disaster response, temporary shelter, and reconstruction (Highfield, 
Peacock, & Van Zandt, 2014; Flanegan et al., 2013; Van Zand et al., 2012). Similarly, this 
study finds public housing residents often cannot afford temporary shelters after disasters due 
to many factors such as lower income, lower bank credit, and limited access to information 
that causes a delay in their rehousing. This inability to adequately respond to disasters may 
result in the long-term displacement of this community in the aftermath of disasters. 
Furthermore, prior studies mentioned that static vulnerability such as their poverty may limit 
their ability to find shelter or new housing units in the aftermath of disasters (Hamideh, & 
Rongerude, 2018). 
This study’s findings about public housing residents are consistent with these prior 
studies on socially vulnerable population. Findings show that a large number of public 
housing units are located in the floodplains which received significant damages. These 
damages resulted in the displacement of a large population. These displacements and 
damages were highlighted in the interviews in terms of the impacts of Hurricane Matthew. In 
the interviews, it is also highlighted that the households of public housing units were 
displaced for a long time, from 6 months to more than 2 years after the hurricane due to 
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constraints resulting from their poverty and their misspending of assisted money. They could 
not afford to find permanent housing because of the limited resources and their poverty. 
Moreover, these cohorts of the community have some challenges during their displacement. 
For example, as a whole, this cohort has not used FEMA assistance funding based on the 
purpose of the assistance in the aftermath of the floods. Most of the families spent those 
assistance funds for purposes other than housing. For example, some of them spent that 
money to replace their damaged properties including TV or car, etc. This aspect of the 
challenges they face was rarely mentioned in the previous literature. The literature instead 
focused on how the limited education of socially vulnerable populations may put them in 
difficult and unfavorable positions for applying to various funding assistance options (Van 
Zandt et al., 2012).  
Furthermore, the high numbers of abandoned and unrepaired public housing units 
show that the vulnerabilities including housing tenure and poverty have impacts on the pace 
of the recovery. This study finds that the residents of public housing cannot restore their own 
units due to their housing tenure. The local Housing Authority is responsible for the recovery 
of these units using governmental funding sources. This dependence results in the fate of 
public housing recovery being open to the discussions and influences of different political 
plans. The lack of representation forces the Housing Authority to pursue any plan, regardless 
of the impacts on the displaced residents. In the State of North Carolina, there was not a 
strong voice in advocating for the recovery of affordable housing. The state’s plans for 
spending CDBG money was therefore not prioritized towards the recovery of affordable 
housing for low-moderate income households. Additionally, the poverty, minority status, and 
the social class of the concerned parties limit the voice of public housing residents. They may 
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face barriers in participating in decision makings or planning for their housing recovery. In 
Lumberton, it was seen that insufficient financial resources, the slow flow of funding, and the 
priority of the state in funding allocations to the improvement of infrastructure instead of 
affordable housing for medium, low-income population reduced the pace of public housing 
units’ recovery.  
The slow pace of recovery has resulted in a shrinkage of public housing stocks for the 
low-income tenants in Lumberton. Based on field observations and interviews with some of 
the present public housing residents in Lumberton, many of those displaced residents whom 
never returned to HACL developments were housed in other housing authorities around 
Robeson County and in the state of North Carolina. It was found that HACL has often helped 
them to find a unit in other housing authorities. Some of those tenants were also offered 
housing options other than public housing units such as vouchers or were assisted in paying 
the down payments for buying a house.  
The administrative staff of HACL believed that it was not good for the city to just 
lose its residents. The city needs to keep its residents due to their role as social capital and 
economic actors. However, with the limited funding sources and the slow pace of recovery of 
these affordable units, the shrinkage in low-income housing stock was inevitable. This 
resulted in the loss of population from those searching for affordable housing. They went to 
neighboring communities to fulfill their needs. This loss of population may have a long-term 
effect on the city’s social capital.  
In the next chapter, I will provide a summary of this study’s findings. These findings 
outline the obstacles for the recovery of public housing units. Lastly, this thesis will conclude 
with recommendations for affordable housing recovery planning and for future studies.  
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CHAPTER 5.    CONCLUSION 
Disasters are not equal opportunity events; they affect people in a community in 
different ways. Pre-disaster socioeconomic disparities are magnified in the aftermath of acute 
shocks. Underprivileged communities therefore have more difficulty in rebounding from 
disasters. One of the marginalized populations that often face many difficulties in the 
aftermath of disasters are the residents of public housing. This study investigated the 
recovery outcomes and challenges of the public housing residents in Lumberton, NC, in the 
aftermath of the floods induced by Hurricane Matthew in 2016. 
 Lumberton was targeted for this study due to the specific conditions present within 
this community. Lumberton has a special combination of racial composition and high 
poverty within the state of North Carolina. The city has considerable percentages of 
minorities and population who live at or below poverty level. Therefore, I used a 
combination of mapping, descriptive statistics, and qualitative analysis to explore 1) specific 
social vulnerabilities of public residents, 2) the impact of these vulnerabilities on recovery 
outcomes, and 3) the impact of funding resources, policies, and plans on the recovery of 
public housing units. These investigations helped this study to outline the obstacles for the 
recovery of public housing units.  
This study found that poverty, and housing tenure comprise the vulnerabilities of 
public housing residents. Segregation in housing market direct the public housing program to 
build the developments in socially vulnerable neighborhoods. Concentration of poverty in 
distressed complexes located in floodplains resulted in a large number of damaged public 
housing units. The 1937 housing Act did not consider any federal provision for the 
maintenance and renovation of the public housing units when the public housing program 
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was introduced. The construction of the units is financed by the federal government, while 
rents should cover the operating and maintenance expenses. However, the residents of these 
units cannot afford a high amount of rent that can cover the maintenance costs. This financial 
limitation affected the quality and the design of the public housing units. Public housing 
authorities estimated that they need at least $70 billion currently unmet capital around the 
U.S. for basic repairs and upkeep (Vock, 2019). This growing proportion of public housing 
exhibits physical distress. This distress may have resulted in a combination of physical 
corrosion and social problems in both normal conditions and in disaster contexts. This huge 
backlog of required maintenances and restorations is a major reason for the loss of about 
10,000 public housing units across the country every year and loss of many public housing 
units during every disaster. 
The disaster damages along with loss of public housing units caused displacement of 
a large number of families for a long period of time. These displaced families could not 
afford their temporary or permanent shelters due to their poverty level due to the depletion of 
their savings and their lower bank credit. These difficulties prevent them to afford the 
secured deposits or other requirements for their temporary and permanent housing. They also 
have limited access to information about using their limited federal financial assistance. 
Public housing residents are not provided with various temporary housing alternatives similar 
to other middle-class households due to their poverty. Moreover, these residents are 
marginalized within their community. Their lack of information and familiarity with 
institutional norms and practices has led to their misinformation about federal financial 
assistance post-disaster such as FEMA assistance. This study shed new light on that public 
housing residents did not use the financial assistance for providing their temporary shelter 
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due to their depleted savings. They used those assisted funds for the replacement of their lost 
properties instead of housing. Therefore, it would be helpful to assist these communities with 
special programs including Disaster Housing Assisted Program (DHAP) regarding the 
provision of housing instead of providing financial assistance in the aftermath of disasters for 
their temporary shelters. It would also be helpful to assist these communities with special 
instructions regarding the provided financial assistance in the aftermath of disasters if they 
are provided any. 
Furthermore, this community cohort is known as a transient population in which the 
displaced households are pushed to be rehoused in other housing authorities if there are any 
available units. However, currently, the national trend of public housing is losing 10,000 
units each year. This means that it will be harder to find excess units to rehouse public 
housing residents displaced by disasters. This study magnifies this growing interrelated issue 
in public housing nationally which should be considered in long-term policies about this 
program.  
The market-based recovery policies do not provide transparent plans for the recovery 
of public housing units which have a special tenure. The market-driven approach of housing 
recoveries has led to minimum intervention of the government in the recovery process. This 
means that the recovery process for those who are not being served by the market including 
public housing residents will be faced with various challenges. The recovery process is not 
an equal event for the whole community but rather one in which some will be winners and 
others losers of the market-driven system.  
On the other hand, a housing authority itself is dependent on the governmental 
funding and political agendas, when planning for the recovery and rehabilitation of the units 
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of their possession. The limited power of the housing authority in state policy-making and 
the fact that public housing carries a certain stigma can force the housing authority to pursue 
plans that do not necessarily prioritize the needs of displaced tenants. 
 Housing authorities’ decisions and efforts for recovery and mitigation of future 
losses are limited by the policies of the state in terms of restriction of assisted funds. For 
example, in Lumberton, the assisted funds were directed to the infrastructure improvements. 
While the housing authority planned various mitigation and recovery programs, the outcome 
of recovery was not acceptable, and none of the plans created by the housing authority were 
executed. This finding will be of interest to look through pre-disaster policies of the states 
and CDBG investments which have impacts on post-disaster plans. Less share of CDBG 
investments on affordable housing for medium, low-income households in comparison with 
infrastructure improvements causes a continuous issue in the aftermath of disasters. Priorities 
other than providing medium-low income households with affordable housing, limited funds, 
as well as the bureaucratic hurdles in allocating the flow of funds has resulted in the delay of 
the public housing recovery. This delay seen in this case study and the national trend of 
public housing decrease, which has been mentioned may contribute to the shrinkage of the 
low-income housing stocks in the U.S. in the long-term.  
The main question of this study aims to outline the obstacles for the recovery of 
public housing units. It is highlighted in this study that the public housing units lag behind 
the other residential units in terms of recovery. The static vulnerabilities of the public 
housing residents affect the recovery outcomes of this community by limiting the access of 
public housing residents to the recovery resources. Their vulnerabilities, including poverty, 
housing tenure, and dependence on the governmental assistance, makes the public housing 
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residents a passive population in recovery decision-making. The public housing authorities 
do not have a strong voice in the states’ decision-making process to advocate for housing for 
medium-low income households. Also, the housing tenure of these units cannot be classified 
as either rental nor owned properties. Therefore, their housing recovery fate is open to the 
decisions of their housing authority which is a function of state’s policies.  
5.1 Recommendations 
Recovery challenges of public housing units observed in this case study provide 
several lessons for recovery practice:  
 Planners have to plan in advance and focus on reducing the spatially 
concentrated vulnerabilities by mapping them and prioritizing mitigation, 
recovery resources, and preparedness activities in neighborhoods and for 
populations with greatest vulnerability in pre-disaster resilience plans. 
 The recovery policy should emphasize the long-term recovery based on risk 
mitigation planning. Reducing social vulnerabilities, improving public 
housing maintenance, and reducing exposure may help the socially vulnerable 
population resistant damages from natural hazards. 
 Federal assistance programs should work on instructions for the receivers of 
the assistance funds to assist them learn about the goals of those funds and 
help them use the grants based on its purpose. FEMA, local agencies, and 
social workers may collaborate together to improve the system of financial 
assistance to improve the efficiency of these funds for the socially vulnerable 
population.  
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 Recovery of affordable housing has to become a priority. Federal recovery 
policy should require the states to plan inclusively for the recovery of 
medium-low-income housing such as public housing developments. 
 HUD should focus on the planning for the recovery, improvement, and risk 
mitigation of the public housing units considering the housing authority 
capacities in the communities with limited resources. 
 HUD policy in terms of RAD program should be considered in the aftermath 
of disasters based on the capacities of housing authorities. HUD should apply 
a comprehensive policy in terms of immediate rehousing and replacements of 
damaged units in post-disaster context.  
 Engage public housing representatives, in decisions about distribution of 
recovery resources, to enable everyone, not only to rebuild their lives, but also 
to seize the window of opportunity to rebuild back better.  
 
5.2 Future Research Directions 
Further research should focus on the following questions about the public housing 
units to further improve the knowledge of disaster recovery planning:  
 What policies can be implemented to reduce social vulnerability 
concentrations in the city and public housing developments? Exploring case 
studies which focus on the deconcentration of poverty and minority in public 
housing developments and the impact of the deconcentration in facing acute 
shocks. 
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 What are the common elements of the successful recovery of socially 
vulnerable populations which succeed in recovery and enhance resilience?  
 What are the elements of the inclusive planning process in which the socially 
vulnerable populations are empowered and are provided with the opportunity 
to build back better? 
 In-depth case studies should explore the gaps of policies in terms of public 
housing recovery. What are the common elements of public housing recovery 
that should be considered in Federal policies?  
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APPENDIX A.    IRB APPROVAL  
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APPENDIX B.    INTERVIEWEES - COMMUNITY LEADERS AND KEY 
STAKEHOLDERS 
 
Category Interviewee Affiliation 
Housing 
Authority 
Adrian E. Lowery Executive Director-HACL 
Barbie Jo Hunt Interim Director of Facilities Maintenance-HACL 
Sheila Oxendine Interim Director of Housing Services-HACL 
Lemark Harris Pembroke Housing Authority Interim Director 
City 
Official 
Wayne Horne City Manager - Lumberton 
Brandon Love The Planning Director and Floodplain Administrator -
Lumberton 
Emergency 
Service 
Stephanie Chavis Director at the Emergency Services for Robeson County  
Mattic L. Caulder Assistant Director at the Emergency Services for Robeson 
County  
Non-Profit 
Paul Langston Consultant at NCBM/ Baptists on Mission Church - Lumberton 
Chip McGuirt Manager at NCBM/ Baptists on Mission Church - Lumberton 
Rev. Rick Foreman Pastor at West Lumberton Baptist Church - Lumberton 
Social 
Service 
Eric Chavis  Robeson County Sheriff 
Dawn Gavasci  Program Manager at Robeson County Department of Social 
Services 
Connie Oxendine Service Program administrator at Robeson County Department 
of Social Services 
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APPENDIX C.    COMMUNITY LEADERS AND KEY STAKEHOLDERS 
INTERVIEW CONSENT SCRIPT 
Consent to Participate in a Research Study 
Colorado State University 
_____________________________________________________________ 
 
Title of study: 
Center of Excellence for Risk-Based Community Resilience Planning 
 
Principal Investigators: 
This project is led by Dr. John van de Lindt and Dr. Bruce Ellingwood, both Professors from 
the Civil and Environmental Engineering Department at Colorado State University. Dr. van 
de Lindt can be reached at 970-491-6697 or via email at jwv@engr.colostate.edu and Dr. 
Ellingwood can be reached at 970-491-5354 or via email at bruce.ellingwood@colostate.edu. 
 
Who is doing the study? 
This five-year project is funded by the National Institute of Standards and Technology 
(NIST). Our research team is made up of professors, postdoctoral fellows, and graduate 
students across 14 universities. Two or more of our field research team members will be 
interviewing you for this project. 
 
What is the purpose of this research and why am I being invited to take part in this 
study? 
You have been chosen to be part of this research study because of your experience with the 
2016 flooding that occurred in Lumberton, N.C. following Hurricane Matthew. We would 
like to speak with you about the choices that you made before, during, and after the flood so 
we can learn more about how people responded to and are beginning to recover from the 
event. Up to 200 people from your community may be invited to be interviewed for this 
study; however, the team will begin interviews, initially, with a smaller group of community 
leaders and key informants. 
 
What will I be asked to do and how long will it take? 
You will be asked to answer questions about what happened before, during, and after the 
flood. We are interested in your experiences with preparedness, evacuation, damage, loss, 
and rebuilding. The interview will be held in a mutually agreeable, private location. With 
your permission, each interview will be audiotaped and will take about 30 minutes of your 
time. We would also like to speak to you in the future to learn more about your experiences 
as they unfold. Also with your permission, the research team may take photos or videotape of 
you or your home.  
 
What will it cost me to participate? 
There is no cost to you for being part of this study and you will not be paid for your time. 
 
What are the possible risks, discomforts, and benefits? 
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It is not possible to identify all potential risks during a research project, but our team has 
taken reasonable safeguards to minimize any known and potential risks. The potential risks 
associated with this study are difficult emotions such as anger and sadness. There is no 
known benefit in participating. We hope, however, this will provide a space for reflection 
and an opportunity to make a difference for others by sharing your knowledge and 
experiences. 
 
Do I have to take part in the study? 
Your participation in this project is completely voluntary. You may withdraw your consent 
and stop participating at any time. You have the right to refuse to answer any question(s) for 
any reason. You also have the right to refuse to be photographed or audio/video recorded. 
 
Who will see the information that I give? 
We will keep private all research records that identify you, to the extent allowed by law. 
Anything that you share during our interview will be kept confidential. In addition, your 
privacy will be maintained in all written and published documents resulting from this study. 
However, if any abuse or illegal activity is discussed, we will have to report that information 
to the authorities. Any reports created from this study will use fake names in place of real 
names of people and organizations. 
 
Other identifying features may be altered as well to protect your confidentiality. Audio files 
will be stored in a secure location. They will be marked with an interview number separate 
from your name. At the end of the study, all audio files will be erased and all other written 
materials will be permanently stored in a secure location. This data will be kept for future 
use. We may be asked to share the research files for audit purposes with the CSU 
Institutional Review Board and the NIST Human Subjects Protection Office. 
 
If you have questions about this study, you should ask the researcher before you sign this 
consent form. If you have questions regarding your rights as a participant, any concerns 
regarding this project, or any dissatisfaction with any aspect of this study, you may contact 
the Colorado State University Institutional Review Board at: 
RICRO_IRB@mail.colostate.edu; or 970-491-1381. 
 
A signed copy of this three-page consent form and Photo/Video-release form will be 
provided to you at the time of the interview. 
 
Participant’s Initials ______ Date ______ 
 
I agree to be audio recorded for this study (please initial): 
 
Yes                  No 
 
If you are willing, we may want to conduct 1-2 more interviews with you over the next two 
years so that we can follow changes in recovery. We have asked for your address below so 
that we may contact you again. I am willing to be contacted again to participate in similar 
studies related to disaster recovery (please initial): 
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Yes                  No 
 
I have read this paper about the study or it was read to me. I know the possible risks and 
benefits. I know that being in this study is voluntary. I choose to be in this study. I know that I 
can withdraw at any time. I know that it is my choice to be audio taped. I know that any 
contact information I provide is optional and will only be used to follow up on the community 
recovery process following Hurricane Matthew. I have received, on the date signed, a copy 
of this document containing two pages. 
 
Signed:         Date:      
 
Name:            Phone:      
 
Address:            
 
             
 
Email:             
 
 
_______________________________________        _____________________   
Signature of Research Staff          Date 
 
Please direct follow-up questions to:  
 
Dr. Sara Hamideh, Department of Community and Regional Planning, Room 399, Iowa State 
University, Ames, IA, 50010, 515-294-5470 
Dr. Van de Lindt, Department of Civil Engineering Room A201, Colorado State University, 
Fort Collins, CO 80523-1301, 970-491-6697 
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APPENDIX D.    COMMUNITY LEADERS AND KEY STAKEHOLDERS 
INTERVIEW GUIDE 
Lumberton field study Wave 3b 
Public Housing Recovery Decisions and Resources: Perspectives of Local Government 
and Other Stakeholders  
_____________________________________________________________ 
 
Housing Authority of City of Lumberton: 
1. Assessment of affordable housing needs in Lumberton before Hurricane Matthew? 
2. Number and type of households on HACL waitlist for different types of public 
housing (PH), change since the 2016 floods? 
3. Discussions and plans before the floods (Matthew and Florence) for replacing PH 
with HOPE-IV? 
4. Impacts of the Matthew and Florence floods on PH units: damage levels, demolished, 
etc. 
5. Process for evacuation, assessing damages, eviction, repair, and demolition of PH 
after Matthew and Florence? 
6. How many of PH units were officially confirmed as demolished/damaged? Where? 
7. Where were PH residents sent after Matthew and Florence (with their vouchers both 
temporary and shelters)? How many vouchers allocated after Matthew and Florence? 
8. Number and status of displaced families after Matthew and Florence? Assessment of 
displacement issues caused by each storm? Differences between displacement issues 
after each storm? 
9. How many of PH residents did return to their units and how many wants to return 
after Matthew?  
10. Plans and timelines for helping PH residents to return? Assessment of the progress? 
11. Number of units that will be demolished for various reason; Number of new units that 
will replace the demolished units; Number of units to be repaired within a certain 
number of years 
12. What resources available for repairing PH? Assessment of the adequacy and 
accessibility of funds? 
13. According to HACL 5-year plan for the fiscal year 2017-2021, three complexes 
(Weaver Court, Myers Park with 30 units and Hilton heights with 42 units) may have 
to be relocated. What is the relocation plans and options? 
14. According to HACL 5-year plan for the fiscal year 2017-2021, two complexes will be 
subjected to de concentration policy (Turner terrace on Spruce Street and Weaver 
Court on Parmele Dr.).  What are the plans for providing housing to current residents 
after the development of these two complexes?  
15. Progress in repairs to PH units after Matthew and Florence?  
16. Challenges in completing the repairs after Matthew: funding, regulations, eligibility, 
etc. 
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17. Opportunities for building affordable housing back better after Hurricanes Matthew 
and Florence? 
 
Other local governmental agencies, nonprofits, advocates, charities involved in housing: 
1. What are the priorities for spending the CDBG-DR funds? How are/have the local 
agencies deciding on the projects?  
2. How are the local agencies getting people involved in discussions about spending 
recovery funds?  
3. Who is/was locally involved in planning to use the CDBG-DR and other recovery 
funding after Hurricane Matthew?  
4. What are the assumptions and expectations about funding allocation and return of 
households? 
5. Assessment of share of housing needs are met by different recovery funds? Unmet 
housing needs? 
6. Number of families that were helped (financial, material, time, etc.) by different 
organizations for housing?  
7. Housing status of the families that received helped 
8. Assessment of affordable housing recovery progress 
9. Obstacles to affordable housing recovery 
10. Which groups falling behind in housing recovery and why 
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APPENDIX E.    LIST OF INTERVIEW CODES 
Code Grounded Code Groups 
SV_PH_Age 8 Social_Vulnerability 
SV_PH_Disability 12 Social_Vulnerability 
SV_PH_Female_Kids 1 Social_Vulnerability 
SV_PH_Insufficient_Voucher/AffordableHousing 31 Social_Vulnerability 
SV_PH_Low_Education 7 Social_Vulnerability 
SV_PH_Low-income 35 Social_Vulnerability 
SV_PH_Minority 3 Social_Vulnerability 
SV_PH_No_Phone 2 Social_Vulnerability 
SV_PH_OldUnits 2 Social_Vulnerability 
SV_PH_Transient_Population 32 Social_Vulnerability 
SV_PH_UnitsInFloodPlain 43 Social_Vulnerability 
Impact_PH_Displacement 76 Disaster_Impact 
Impact_PH_Displacement_new locations 31 Disaster_Impact 
Impact_PH_Financial_Loss 11 Disaster_Impact 
Impact_PH_instability 14 Disaster_Impact 
Impact_PH_Psychological 1 Disaster_Impact 
Impact_PH_School 0 Disaster_Impact 
Impact_PH_socialSupport loss 2 Disaster_Impact 
Impact_PH_Unit_Damage 37 Disaster_Impact 
Impact_PH_Work/job/payloss 2 Disaster_Impact 
Recovery__PH_CDBG-DR rules and priorities 17 Recovery_Disparities 
Recovery__PH_CDBG-history in the NC State 11 Recovery_Disparities 
Recovery__PH_Future flood risk 29 Recovery_Disparities 
Recovery__PH_HA_before Matthew 12 Recovery_Disparities 
Recovery__PH_Slow_Pace 17 Recovery_Disparities 
Recovery_PH_Limited_Knowledge_FinancialAid_Application 8 Recovery_Disparities 
Recovery_PH_No _Policies 9 Recovery_Disparities 
Recovery_PH_No_Power 27 Recovery_Disparities 
Recovery_PH_No_RecoveryIncentives 15 Recovery_Disparities 
Recovery_PH_No_Solid_Plans 23 Recovery_Disparities 
Recovery_PH_NotEnough_Funding 30 Recovery_Disparities 
Recovery_PH_NotFulfilled_Plans 7 Recovery_Disparities 
Recovery_PH_Slow_FundingFlow 17 Recovery_Disparities 
Recovery_PH_Alternatives_OtherHA 29 Recovery_Outcome 
Recovery_PH_NotCompleted 13 Recovery_Outcome 
Recovery__PH_Relocation_Issues 20 Recovery_Outcome 
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APPENDIX F.    PUBLIC HOUSING RESIDENTS INTERVIEW CONSENT SCRIPT 
Two-Year Post-Hurricane Matthew Field Study in Lumberton, North Carolina 
Recovery Challenges of Public Housing Residents 
Consent Script 
OMB CONTROL NO. 0693-0078   Expiration date:  07/31/2019 
    ____________________________________________________________ 
 
Hello, my name is Sayma Khajehei and I am a graduate student from Iowa State 
University in the Department of Community and Regional Planning. I am conducting a 
research study in Lumberton on community recovery following the flooding that occurred 
due to Hurricane Matthew in early October 2016. I would like to speak with you about how 
this event has continued to affect your household. In particular, I am interested in learning 
about the process of recovering from the flooding. 
I would like to ask you some questions about your household’s experience after the flood. 
You should be older than 18 years of age to participate in this study. This interview will be 
recorded with a digital voice recorder. I will only record the interview with your permission. 
Participation will take approximately 30-45 minutes, depending on the experience of your 
household with Hurricane Matthew. Your participation is voluntary. If you decide to 
participate in the study, you may withdraw your consent and stop participation at any time 
without penalty. Your name will not be audio-recorded, so it will not be connected with the 
information that you provide.  Information about you will only be used by the research team 
for the project described in this document. 
I will be collecting information about the damage to your home, the process of making 
repairs, and how the flood disrupted your household’s living arrangements and daily life. I 
will not collect any unique identifiable individual or household information during this 
interview. Also, when I report and share my findings, I will combine the data from all 
participants into summary to guarantee that no individual or household can be identified by 
any chance. There are NO KNOWN RISKS to you for participating in this interview.  
You will receive a $20 gift card in appreciation of your participation, regardless of how much 
of the focus group or interview you complete. I hope to gain more knowledge on how you 
and others were affected by Hurricane Matthew and the flooding so that I can learn from 
your experiences to help public housing communities better prepare for similar events in the 
future. 
If you have questions about the study, you can contact my Thesis supervisor, Sara Hamideh, 
at the contact information listed below. This study has been approved by the Iowa State 
University IRB. For questions concerning participant rights, please contact the Iowa State 
University’s Office for Responsible Research at 515-294-1516.    
Thank you again for your time and participation in our study. 
 
Sincerely, 
Sayma Khajehei, Graduate Student Researcher, cell: 515- 708-4763, khajehei@iastate.edu 
99 
Sara Hamideh, Thesis advisor, cell: 979-436-7849, shamideh@iastate.edu 
 
Consent and Authorization Provisions 
Your signature indicates that you voluntarily agree to participate in this study, that the study 
has been explained to you, that you have been given the time to read the document and that 
your questions have been satisfactorily answered. You will receive a copy of the written 
informed consent prior to your participation in the study. The regulations require that a copy 
of the informed consent document shall be given to the person signing the form.  
 
Participant’s Name (printed) _________________________________________________ 
            
Participant’s Signature________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
100 
APPENDIX G.    PUBLIC HOUSING RESIDENTS INTERVIEW GUIDE 
Lumberton Field Study 
Recovery Challenges of Public Housing Residents 
        ____________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Did your unit get flooded after Hurricane Matthew, 2016? How extensive was the 
damage? 
2. Where did you stay after evacuation? How long have you been there? Did you 
feel safe there? were your daily needs met? 
3. Is your unit recovered completely now? How long have you waited for the unit to 
be recovered? Where did you stay during this period? how would you describe 
your living conditions while away? 
4. Did you have any alternative to choose for staying temporarily? How did you 
learn about where to go to stay during the recovery process? 
5. Did you have any alternative to move to another public housing development in 
another site? 
6. Who did rebuild your unit? Have you been informed about the reconstruction 
process? 
7. Did you get any assistance other than shelter and housing in the aftermath of the 
flood? What kind of assistance did you get? 
8. Was it easy for you to get information about assistance and the application 
process, and recovery process after the flood? 
9. What challenges did you have in the aftermath of the flood in terms of housing, 
financial assistance, food, information, etc.? 
10. What were your main expectations from the housing authority in the aftermath of 
the flood? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
